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Abstract
We consider two game-theoretic settings to determine the optimal values of an issuers interchange fee
rate, an acquirers merchant discount rate, and a merchants retail price in a credit card network. In
the rst setting, we investigate a two-stage game problem in which the issuer and the acquirer rst
negotiate the interchange fee rate, and the acquirer and the retailer then determine their merchant
discount rate and retail price, respectively. In the second setting, motivated by the recent U.S. bill
H.R. 2695,we develop a three-player cooperative game in which the issuer, the acquirer, and the
merchant form a grand coalition and bargain over the interchange fee rate and the merchant discount
rate. Following the cooperative game, the retailer makes its retail pricing decision. We derive both
the Shapley value- and the nucleolus-characterized, and globally-optimal unique rates for the grand
coalition. Comparing the two game settings, we nd that the participation of the merchant in the
negotiation process can result in the reduction of both rates. Moreover, the stability of the grand
coalition in the cooperative game setting may require that the merchant should delegate the credit
card business only to the issuer and the acquirer with su¢ ciently low operation costs. We also show
that the grand coalition is more likely to be stable and the U.S. bill H.R. 2695is thus more e¤ective,
if the degree of division of labour in the credit card network is higher as the merchant, the acquirer, and
the issuer are more specialized in the retailing, the acquiring, and the issuing operations, respectively.
Key words: interchange fee rate; merchant discount rate; Nash bargaining; Stackelberg game; super-
modularity; Shapley value; nucleolus.
1 Introduction
In todays retailing market, many consumers consider the credit card payment as an important, domi-
nating means to shop from merchants. As the Nilson Report indicates, 795.5 million MasterCard and
Visa cards were held by the U.S. consumers in 2004 [13]. The consumers who intend to buy now and
pay later are more likely to complete transactions with credit cards. In the United States, the aggregate
credit card transaction amount was 1.7 trillion in 2003, and this number has been quickly growing [13].
For major benets associated with credit-card transactions for both consumers and businesses, see,
e.g., Hartman [18].
A typical credit card operation in reality usually involves two steps, as shown in Figure 1. In the rst
step, consumers buy products from the merchant and complete their transactions by conrming their
credit card payments. In the second step, consumers pay the total credit-card transaction amount
i.e., consumers total expense that is calculated as the sum of the merchants sales revenue (retail
price times sales quantity) for all products from their bank accounts to the issuer. Next, the issuer
retains an interchange fee that is computed as the transaction amount times an interchange fee rate
f as its revenue and transfers the remaining amount to the acquirer. The acquirer then charges
the merchant a discount fee that equals the transaction amount times a merchant discount rate d.
Note that the discount fee includes the issuers interchange fee. That is, for an one-dollar credit card
transaction, the acquirer obtains the merchant discount d but pays the interchange fee f to the issuer.
It thus follows that the acquirers revenue generated from this credit card business is (d   f) total
transaction amount. To assure the acquirers non-negative prot, we realistically assume that d  f .
As a result, the merchants sales revenue is (1   d) total transaction amount. For specic examples
illustrating the credit card operation, see, e.g., Hunt [20].
Figure 1: The two-step credit card transactions. Note that d and f denote the merchant discount rate
and the interchange fee rate, respectively.
In this paper, we consider a three-echelon credit card network that involves an issuer (a nancial
rm serving consumers), an acquirer (a nancial rm serving the merchant), and a merchant serving
consumers in a consumer market. The consumers use the credit cards (that are issued by the issuer)
to buy from the merchant and pay their credit-card bills prior to the due dates. In the credit card
network, the interchange fee is used to compensate the issuer for bearing the risk of issuing credit
cards, and the merchant discount fee is used to motivate the acquirer to maintain the merchants
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account and process credit card transactions. The interchange and merchant discount fees have been
among the largest costs of merchants who accept the credit card payments (Akers et al. [1]). If the
interchange fee rate is increased, then the issuer benets more from the credit card operation, and the
acquirer may accordingly raise its merchant discount rate so as to assure its protability. As a result,
the merchants sales revenue may be reduced, and the merchant may respond by increasing its retail
prices to improve its prot. However, a higher retail price may discourage consumers from buying
the product, thereby resulting in a reduction in the total transaction amount and thus a decrease in
the issuers, the acquirers, and the merchants prots. Following the above facts, it is important to
properly determine the interchange fee rate, the merchant discount rate, and the retail prices; but,
such a decision problem has not been considered in existing publications, as indicated by our literature
review in Section 2.
In practice, the interchange fee rate is either negotiated by the issuer and the acquirer or determined
jointly by the issuer, the acquirer, and the merchant. Accordingly, we consider two game-theoretic
settings to derive the optimal interchange fee rate, merchant discount rate, and retail price. In Sections
3, we investigate the rst setting that involves a two-stage game problem in which the merchant does
not participate in the negotiation of the interchange fee rate. This scenario is consistent with the fact
that the interchange fee rate is normally centrally determined by the credit card companies such as
Visa and MasterCard, through a committee comprising at least partially representatives of issuers and
acquirers (Small and Wright [39]). That is, in the rst stage, the issuer and the acquirer bargain over
the interchange fee rate, as discussed by Balto [3] and Small and Wright [39]. In the second stage, using
the negotiated interchange fee rate, the acquirer determines a merchant discount rate and announces
it to the merchant, who then makes its retail pricing decision. Note that our two-stage game involves
a sequential nancial decision problem in which, after an interchange fee rate is negotiated by the
acquirer and the issuer, the acquirer determines a merchant discount rate, which is not negotiated by
the acquirer and the merchant. The sequential decision problem is in gear with the fact that each
acquirer has a real operation cost in addition to the interchange fee, and needs to create prot by
adding a mark-up to the interchange fee, as discussed at MasterCard.com [27]. Since an acquirers
protis actually a mark-up i.e., the di¤erence between the merchant discount and the interchange
fee minus the operation cost, we nd that, given an interchange fee, the acquirer should make a
decision on the markup or the merchant discount rate to create a prot. In fact, we can learn
from MasterCard.com [27] that each major credit card network (e.g., Visa, MasterCard) announces
its interchange fee rate publicly by, e.g., releasing the information online. This also implies that the
interchange fee rate is negotiated before the merchant discount rate is determined by the acquirer. For
extant publications concerning the above sequential nancial decision problem, see, for example, Akers
et al. [1] and Rochet and Tirole [33], who assumed that an acquirers mark-up is its own operation
(service) cost and set the merchant discount as the mark-up plus the interchange fee.
In the two-stage game setting, the second stage involves a sequential (Stackelberg) game in which
the acquirer and the merchant act as the leader and the follower, respectively. We use backward
induction to solve such a game. More specically, in Section 3, we begin by solving the Stackelberg
game between the acquirer and the merchant, assuming that the interchange fee rate is given. We then
2
use the interchange fee rate-dependent Stackelberg solution to develop the issuers and the acquirers
prot functions, and use the solution concept of Nash bargaining scheme [29] to characterize the
negotiated interchange fee rate. We show that, in the two-stage game setting, the interchange-fee
negotiation between the issuer and the acquirer helps entice the acquirer to stay in the credit card
network.
In Section 4, we consider the second game setting that involves a three-player cooperative game in
which the issuer, the acquirer, and the merchant bargain over the interchange fee rate and the merchant
discount rate. This game is motivated by a recent U.S. legislation. In June 2009, John Conyers and Bill
Shuster who are the House Judiciary Committee Chairman Representatives introduced the Credit
Card Fair Fee Act of 2009 (H.R. 2695)[19] to the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America, which then enacted the bill to enable merchants to engage in collectively bargaining
on a large scale with banks belonging to credit card networks such as Visa, MasterCard, etc. As John
Conyers and Bill Shuster explained, this legislation would allow merchants to collectively negotiate with
banks (i.e., acquirers and issuers) for certain credit card fees (i.e., interchange fee rate and merchant
discount rate), and ultimately reduce the costs (i.e., retail prices) of everyday goods for consumers [50].
We note that, before 2009, many credit card companies (networks) did not allow merchants to directly
bargain over the interchange fee rate with issuers and acquirers. But certain large merchants such as
Wal-Mart could still bargain for a lower interchange fee rate (Akers et al. [1]).
We thus develop a two-step approach to nd the rates for the cooperative game setting. Following
the approach, we rst construct a three-player cooperative game in characteristic-function form (von
Neumann and Morgenstern [45, Ch. VI]). Then, we investigate whether there exist an interchange
fee rate and a merchant discount rate so that the issuer, the acquirer, and the merchant are willing
to cooperate for the credit card business. For similar approaches, see, e.g., Petrosjan and Zaccour
[30], Sexton [36], etc. We show that, our three-player cooperative game is supermodular only when
both the issuer and the acquirer can signicantly contribute i.e., generate su¢ cient prot surplus
to the credit card network. We then apply Shapley value, the nucleolus, and the globally-optimal
solution to determine the interchange fee rate and the merchant discount rate that result in a fair
allocation of the system-wide prot among the three players. We nd that, for most cases, the Shapley
value-characterized rates cannot assure the non-empty core; but, we can always nd the nucleolus-
characterized and the globally-optimal rates that guarantee the non-emptiness of the core and thus
assure the stability of the grand coalition. Our cooperative game analysis for such a nance problem is
an important focus of this paper; for other applications of the cooperative game theory in the nance-
operation interface area, see, e.g., Gow and Thomas [17], where the concepts of Shapley value and the
nucleolus were used to determine interchange fees for bank ATM networks.
Comparing our analytic results in the two game settings, we nd that the participation of the
merchant in the negotiation process indeed helps reduce both rates, as expected by the U.S. bill H.R.
2695.We also show that the grand coalition is more likely to be stable and the U.S. bill H.R. 2695
is thus more e¤ective, if the degree of division of labour in the credit card network is higher as the
merchant, the acquirer, and the issuer are more specialized in the retailing, the acquiring, and the
issuing operations, respectively. This result may be justied by the fact that, in the United States, the
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degree of division of labour is high in the credit card business, as indicated by a recent report in [32].
Then, in Section 5, we discuss the implications for the two-player games with a single nancial rm
acting for both the acquiring and the issuing operations, and nd that most results for the three-player
games also hold for the two-player games. We also investigate the robustness of our results when we
consider a logistic demand function, and nd that our main managerial results hold for the game with
the logistic function. Our paper ends with a summary of major concluding remarks in Section 6. The
proofs of all theorems and a corollary are relegated to online Appendix A.
2 Literature Review
This paper is associated with those concerning retail pricing-, interchange fee rate-, and merchant
discount rate-related problems in credit card networks. Most existing relevant papers have been re-
viewed by Chakravorti [11], Hunt [20], Bolt and Chakravorti [6], and Verdier [44]. Chakravorti [11]
discussed the costs and benets of credit cards to network participants, and summarized major pub-
lications that investigated certain key features in credit card networks, including merchant pricing
policy, interchange fees, merchant acceptance, and network competition. Hunt [20] provided a brief
overview of the economics of the payment card industry. Verdier [44] surveyed the recent literature
about the interchange fee rate in payment card systems with an emphasis on the ongoing debate that
opposes banks to the regulatory institutions or the competition authorities in various countries. Bolt
and Chakravorti [6] classied relevant economic models for credit card operations into the following
ve categories: (i) models focusing on interchange fees; (ii) models with price di¤erentiation at the
point of sale; (iii) models with competition between networks; (iv) models accounting for the role of
credit; and (v) models with competition among payment instruments. Our paper is closely related to
those in categories (i) and (ii). Below we review some relevant works in these two categories.
Baxter [4] constructed a one-period model to investigate an interchange fee problem, assuming that
the market is perfectly competitive for payment service and consumption goods. The author concluded
that the interchange fee is an important and necessary tool that balances consumersand the merchants
demands and the issuersand the acquirerscosts. Schmalensee [34] extended Baxters model in [4]
by assuming that issuers and acquirers have signicant market powers while merchants are perfectly
competitive. Similar to Baxter [4], Schmalense [34] found that, as a balancing device, the interchange
fee can increase the value of a credit card system by properly allocating costs between issuers and
acquirers and thus reasonably determining the cost allocation between consumers and merchants. We
note that both Baxter [4] and Schmalensee [34] ignored the strategic interactions of consumers and
merchants.
As an early work involving the strategic interactions of consumers and merchants, Rochet and Tirole
[33] constructed a quantitative model in which issuers have market powers but acquirers are perfectly
competitive, and consumers and merchants decide rationally on whether to buy or to accept a payment
card. They found that, due to the issuersmarket powers, the socially-optimal interchange fee rate for
the central planner is higher than that in Baxter [4]. Wright [48] assumed that the merchants may not
accept credit cards for some strategic reasons, and developed a model in which the partial participation
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of heterogeneous consumers and merchants is allowed in a two-sided market. The author found that
the privately-optimal interchange fee rate may be very high.
All of the above papers considered the centralized case in which the interchange fee rate is de-
termined by a central planner or a credit card company/association such as Visa and MasterCard.
However, Balto [3] questioned the rationality of the centrally-determined interchange fee rate, and
argued that a lower interchange fee rate could be determined as a result of the bilateral negotiation
between the acquirers and the issuers.
To the best of our knowledge, Small and Wright [39] is a seminal paper that assumed the inter-
change fee rate is negotiated rather than centrally determined. Small and Wright constructed a Nash
bargaining model to characterize the bilateral bargaining over the interchange fee rate. They dis-
cussed the hold-up problem that results from the honour all cards ruleand found that, as a result of
implementing the rule, the bilaterally-negotiated interchange fee rate may be higher than the centrally-
determined interchange fee rate. However, Small and Wright [39] did not include the merchants retail
pricing decision in their model. In addition, Thomas [42] used the multi-player cooperative game the-
ory to analyze the credit card-related problems. Motived by the major changes in the distribution of
the credit card costs e.g., the introduction of annual fees, the lowering of merchant service charges,
etc. in the U.K. at the end of 1980s, the author analyzed the fair allocation of the credit card-related
costs among the credit card companies, the retailers who accept the credit card payments, and the
cardholders. More specically, Thomas [42] developed a credit-card cooperative game in the linear
characteristic-value function, applied the concepts of the core, Shapley value, and the nucleolus to
numerical examples, and performed a sensitivity analysis to examine the impacts of debit cards on
credit-card fee structures. But, Thomas [42] did not analytically consider the interchange fee rate,
merchant discount rate, and the retail prices.
Di¤erent from the aforementioned papers, we examine a two-stage game to investigate the nego-
tiated interchange fee rate and to derive the optimal merchant discount rate and the optimal retail
pricing decision. In addition, motivated by the recent U.S. legislation H.R. 2695 [19], we consider a
three-player game where the acquirer, the issuer, and the merchant negotiate the interchange fee rate
and the merchant discount rate. This signicantly distinguishes our paper from the existing literature.
3 The Two-Stage Game Analysis
In this section, we assume that the acquirer and the issuer are two separate nancial rms, which is
in gear with the following fact: In a recent report released by Divisions of Research & Statistics and
Monetary A¤airs in the U.S. Federal Reserve Board [32], Prager et al. listed the top 10 U.S. acquirers
and the top 10 U.S. issuers, and their corresponding shares of all credit card transactions (in dollars) in
2007. From that report (see online Appendix B), we nd that, in 2007, the top 10 acquirers and issuers
held 88.7% and 89.6% of all acquiring- and issuing-related dollar value transactions, respectively. This
shows that the top nancial rms can properly represent the acquirers and issuers in the U.S. credit card
business. In addition, among the top rms, only Bank of America is both a top acquirer with a share
of 17.8% and a top issuer with a share of 14.6%. Therefore, the percentage of the transactions by the
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rms acting mainly in the acquiring operation and by the rms acting mainly in the issuing operation
can be roughly estimated as (88:7%   17:8%)=88:7% = 79:9% and (89:6%   14:6%)=89:6% = 83:7%,
respectively. The percentage of the transactions in the acquiring business and that in the issuing
business by the rms acting in both operations are calculated as 20.1% and 16.3%, respectively. The
above percentages imply that the acquiring and the issuing operations aremostly performed by separate
nancial rms. Accordingly, in this paper, we focus on the three-player games involving a merchant,
an acquirer, and an issuer, who are three separate rms. The implications for the two-player games
with a merchant and a nancial rm acting in both the acquiring and the issuing operations will be
discussed later in Section 5.1.
Moreover, we learn from Section 1 that, in practice, the acquirer should rst bargain with the issuer
over the interchange fee rate, and secondly determine its merchant discount rate and announce it to
the retailer, who then makes its retail price. Accordingly, we analyze a two-stage game to determine
the interchange fee rate f , the merchant discount rate d, and retail price p of a product in a credit
card network.
1. In the rst stage, the issuer and the acquirer bargain over the interchange fee rate, which can
be modeled as a two-person cooperative game. We use the concept of Nash bargaining scheme
to characterize the negotiated interchange fee rate. In this stage, the issuer and the acquirer
(i) cooperate jointly serve the credit card network and (ii) compete bargain over the
interchange fee rate for the division of the prot resulting from the credit card operation at the
same time. This can be actually described as the co-opetition,as discussed by Brandenburger
and Nalebu¤ [8].
2. In the second stage, the acquirer determines and announces a merchant discount rate to the
merchant, who then makes its retail pricing decision. This is a non-cooperative Stackelberg game
in which the acquirer and the merchant act as the leader and the follower, respectively.
The above indicates that a cooperative game is followed by a non-cooperative game, which appears
to be an interesting game structure. Such a structure di¤ers from biform games discussed by Branden-
burger and Stuart [7], who considered a two-stage game model involving a non-cooperative game in
the rst stage and a cooperative game in the second stage. Specically, we learn from [7] that a biform
game precisely reects the idea that business strategies (in the non-cooperative setting) can shape the
competitive environment in which players bargain over their payo¤s. But, our two-stage game model
indicates that some playerscooperative behaviors can determine a non-cooperative setting in which
those and other players then choose equilibrium decisions.
One may note that, in reality, the merchant (e.g., the AEON Japan Group) may not cooperate with
the external acquirer or issuer but instead operate by itself for the acquiring and the issuing business,
which is actually unusual. In this section, we focus on the analysis of the two-stage game, which is a
traditional and usual setting. Our analysis for the case with the merchant acting in both the acquiring
and the issuing operations is provided in online Appendix C.1. Next, we use backward induction to
solve this two-stage game problem.
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3.1 The Analysis of the Stackelberg Game in the Second Stage
Given the interchange fee rate f , we derive the merchants best-response retail price p(d; f), and then
nd the Stackelberg solution (d(f); p(f)).
3.1.1 The Merchants Best-Response Pricing Decision
The merchant buys the product at the unit acquisition cost c, and sells it at the retail price p. The
demand for the product, denoted by q(p), is a deterministic, linear, and price-dependent function,
which is given as q(p) =    p, where  > 0 denotes the price-independent demand and  > 0
represents the marginal impact of the price. This assumption has been widely used in economics,
nance, and operations management; see Bertrand [5], Corbett and Karmarkar [12], Lim and Ho [24],
and the references therein.
To assure that the demand q(p) is non-negative, we assume that the parameter  is su¢ ciently
large such that   c. Moreover, to generate the non-negative sales of the product, the merchant
should determine the retail price such that p  =. Thus, (p   c)=p = 1   c=p  (   c)=. Note
that the ratio (p c)=p is regarded as the well-known Lerner index[23]. Lerner index reects a rms
market power; that is, a rm with a higher value of Lerner index has a greater power in the market
that it serves. Therefore, to assure that q(p)  0, the merchants market power for the product should
be smaller than or equal to (  c)=, which is the relative measure of the maximum demand for the
product (i.e.,  c) over the constant, price-independent demand . We can compute the merchants
sales revenue and total acquisition cost as R  p  q(p) = p(   p) and C  c  q(p) = c(   p),
respectively.
In practice, some merchants may accept both credit card payments and other common payment
methods such as cash, checks, debit cards, etc., whereas other merchants may be unwilling to accept
credit cards as a transaction medium. Since the early 1990s, among all payment methods, the per-
centage of the transaction dollar volume by credit cards has been rapidly increasing. We learn from
Mann [25] that, as the U.S. Department of Commerce statistics indicate, credit card volume in 1999
accounted for about 23% of the value paid in all U.S. consumer payment transactions. The Association
for Financial Professionals reported in [2] that, in 2005, 47% of total transaction dollar volume at
the U.S. retailers were based on consumer purchases with credit cards. For details regarding the U.S.
purchase transactions (in dollars) with credit cards from 1990 to 2007, see the statistics released by
Divisions of Research & Statistics and Monetary A¤airs in the U.S. Federal Reserve Board [32]. Based
on the above facts, we assume that a percentage of the merchants sales revenue R is generated from
the consumer purchases with the credit card. Note that, in reality, a consumers willingness of using a
credit card for his or her purchases is mainly a¤ected by (i) the xed fee (including, e.g., the annual
fee) charged by the issuer denoted by F and (ii) the density of the issuers network denoted by
 2 [0; 1], which reects how widespread the issuers network is. Accordingly, we assume that the
percentage of consumptions with the credit card is dependent on F and . Hereafter, we denote such a
percentage by (F; ), which should be decreasing in F but increasing in , i.e., @(F; )=@F  0 and
@(F; )=@  0. As a result, the remaining sales revenue [1  (F; )]R results from the transactions
with other payment methods.
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If the merchant does not accept the credit card, then it can only serve the consumers who does
not pay with the credit card, and can thus achieve the prot [1   (F; )](R   C). If the merchant
decides to join the credit card network, then its sales prot can be calculated as R   C. Noting that
the merchant needs to pay the acquirer the merchant discount fee T = (F; )dR, we nd that the
merchants prot as R   C   T . Therefore, given the merchant discount rate d, the merchants prot
is based on whether or not it accepts the credit card; that is,
M (p) =
(
NCM (p)  [1  (F; )](p  c)(  p), if does not accept the credit card;
CM (p)  f[1  (F; )d]p  cg(  p), if accepts the credit card,
(1)
where the superscripts NCand Crepresent no credit cardand credit card,respectively. We
note that, if the merchant decides to accept the credit card, then, in order to assure that [1 (F; )d]p 
c  0, the acquirer should determine its merchant discount rate such that d  (  c)=[(F; )].
We can calculate the optimal prices maximizing NCM (p) and 
C
M (p) in (1) as p1  (= + c)=2
and p2(d)  f= + c=[1   (F; )d]g=2, respectively. Since 0  f  d  (   c)=[(F; )] < 1 and
0  (F; )  1, we nd that p1  p2(d), which implies that the acceptance of credit card transactions
would induce the merchant to raise its retail price. Moreover, we nd that, as d increases when the
merchant accepts the credit card, the merchant should raise its retail price. Substituting p1 and p2(d)
into NCM (p) and 
C
M (p), respectively, we obtain the merchants maximum prot without credit card
transactions as NCM (p1) = [1 (F; )](= c)2=4 which is independent of d and that with credit
card transactions as CM (p2(d)) = [1  (F; )d]f=   c=[1  (F; )d]g2=4 which is decreasing in d
as @[CM (p2(d))]=@d < 0.
As limd!0 CM (p2(d)) = (=   c)2=4  NCM (p1) and limd!( c)=[(F;)] CM (p2(d)) = 0 <
NCM (p1), there must exist a unique value  such that 
C
M (p2(d))

d=
= NCM (p1). Solving 
C
M (p2(d)) =
NCM (p1), we have,
    c
(F; )
"
1 
p
[1  (F; )]2(  c)2 + 4c[1  (F; )]  [1  (F; )](  c)
2
#
, (2)
which is greater than zero but smaller than (  c)=[(F; )]. If d  , then CM (p2(d))  NCM (p1),
and the merchant should accept the transactions with credit cards; otherwise, the merchant should not
accept credit card transactions.
In order to induce the merchant to participate in the credit card network, the acquirer should set its
merchant discount rate d  . As a result, when the merchant accepts the credit card, the d-dependent
sales revenue is calculated as,
R(d) = p2(d) q(p2(d)) = 1
4

2

  c
2
[1  (F; )d]2

; (3)
and the merchants prot is computed as,
M (d) = 
C
M (p) =
1
4
f[1  (F; )d]  cg2
[1  (F; )d] , (4)
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which is decreasing in d and (F; ); that is, the merchants prot is reduced when the acquirer increases
its merchant discount rate d or more consumers prefer to shop with credit cards.
3.1.2 The Interchange Fee Rate-Dependent Stackelberg Solution
From Figure 1, we nd that the acquirers revenue can be obtained as (d   f) times the total credit
card transaction amount (F; )R(d), where R(d) is given as in (3). Assume that the acquirer incurs
an operation cost cA per dollar of credit-card transaction. Hence, given the interchange fee rate f , the
acquirer determines its merchant discount rate by maximizing the following constrained problem,
max
d
A(d) = (d f cA)(F; )R(d) = (F; )(d  f   cA)
4

2

  c
2
[1  (F; )d]2

, s.t. f+cA  d  ,
(5)
where d   f   cA represents the acquirers net prot per dollar of credit-card transaction; and the
constraint (i.e., f + cA  d  ) guarantees the participation of both the acquirer and the merchant
in the credit card business.
Theorem 1 The optimal interchange fee rate-dependent merchant discount rate d(f) is
d(f) =
(
d1(f), if f  f^ ,
 (constant), if f^  f  ,
where d1(f) is a unique solution satisfying the equation that 2[1 (F; )d1(f)]3 = 2c2[1+(F; )d1(f) 
2(F; )(f + cA)]; and,
f^  [1 + (F; )  2cA(F; )]
2c2   [1  (F; )]32
22c2(F; )
. (6)
We also nd that d1(f) is increasing in f , i.e., @[d1(f)]=@f  0; but, @[d1(f)]=@f < 1. Moreover, d1(f)
is a convex function of f , i.e., @2[d1(f)]=@f2  0. 
Substituting d(f) (given in the above theorem) into p2(d) which is given in Section 3.1.1 yields
the f -dependent Stackelberg retail price for each product. In addition, Theorem 1 indicates that, if the
interchange fee rate f rises, then the acquirer should respond by increasing its merchant discount rate.
But, this may discourage the merchant to accept customerspurchases with credit cards. In order to
assure that the merchant is willing to trade with credit cards, the acquirer should bear a portion of
the increase in the interchange fee rate. It thus follows that the increase in the merchant discount rate
is smaller than the increase in the interchange fee rate.
3.2 The Analysis of the Two-Player Cooperative Game in the First Stage
We now investigate the rst-stage game problem in which the acquirer and the issuer bargain over the
interchange fee rate f , anticipating the f -dependent Stackelberg solution as obtained in Section 3.1.
We next use the cooperative game concept of Nash bargaining scheme (NBS) [29] to characterize the
negotiated interchange fee rate. The NBS represents a unique bargaining solution that can be obtained
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by solving the following maximization problem: maxy1;y2(y1   y01)(y2   y02), s.t. y1  y01 and y2  y02,
where yi and y0i correspond to player is prot and security level (a.k.a. status quo point), respectively,
for i = 1; 2. This concept has been broadly applied to analyze a variety of bargaining problems in the
nance eld; see, e.g., Cai [10], Ericsson and Renault [15], etc.
In our bargaining problem, we, w.l.o.g., assume that the acquirer and the issuer are player 1 and
player 2, respectively. Thus, y1 = A(d(f)), which can be easily obtained by substituting d(f) in
Theorem 1 into (5), and y2 = I(f). Next, we compute the issuers prot I(f). The issuer can attain
the interchange fee f  (F; )  R(d(f) from the credit card transactions, where R(d(f)) is found
by replacing d in (3) with d(f) in Theorem 1. Moreover, as in practice, the issuer often charges each
consumer who holds the credit card a xed (transaction amount-independent) fee including, e.g., the
annual fee, the penalty for the late payment, and the expense over the credit limit and a credit interest
that is calculated as an interest rate times the consumers transaction amount. For the xed fees and the
interest rates in recent U.S. credit card statistics, see Woolsey and Schulz [47]. Recalling from Section
3.1.1 that the xed fee is represented by F , we denote the interest rate for the credit card issued by
the issuer by t. Therefore, the issuers total revenue from the credit card transactions is calculated as
F+(f+t)(F; )R(d(f). Letting cI (cI < f) denote the issuers operation cost per dollar of credit
card transaction, we compute the issuers prot as I(f)  F + (f + t  cI) (F; )R(d(f)). For
a similar calculation, see Brito and Hartley [9] who did not consider the xed cost but only involved
the interest rate into their model.
Note that neither the acquirer nor the issuer can gain any prot from credit-card transactions if
they do not join the credit card network. Thus, the status quo point is (y01; y
0
2) = (0; 0). Therefore, to
derive the NBS-based interchange fee rate for the two-player cooperative game, we need to solve the
maximization problem that maxf (f)  A(d(f)) I(f); that is,
max
f
(f) =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
1(f)  (F; )[d1(f)  f   cA]
4

2

  c
2
[1  (F; )d1(f)]2



F +
(F; )(f + t  cI)
4

2

  c
2
[1  (F; )d1(f)]2

, if cI  f  f^ ,
2(f)  (F; )[  f   cA]
4

2

  c
2
[1  (F; )]2



F +
(F; )(f + t  cI)
4

2

  c
2
[1  (F; )]2

, if f^  f  .
(7)
Next, we accordingly nd the optimal interchange fee rate under the constraint cI  f  f^ and that
under the constraint f^  f  , which are then compared to obtain the NBS-characterized interchange
fee rate.
Theorem 2 The functions 1(f) and 2(f) in (7) are both log-concave in f . When the acquirer and
the issuer bargain over the interchange fee rate, the NBS-based rate f is uniquely determined as,
f =
8<: ~f2 
+ cI   cA   t  r1
2
2 [f^ ; ], if r1  r2 and 1(f1 )  2( ~f2),
f1  min( ~f1; f^) 2 [cI ; f^ ], otherwise,
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where
r1  4F
(F; )f2=   c2=[1  (F; )]2g and r2 
[1  (F; )]32   2c2
2c2(F; )
+ cA + cI   t,
~f1 is the unique solution of the rst-order condition that @[1(f)]=@f = 0, and f^ is dened as in (6).

As the above theorem implies, if the acquirers and/or the issuers per dollar operation costs (i.e.,
cA and cI) are su¢ ciently small such that r1  r2, then the NBS-based interchange fee rate is no more
than f^ . Otherwise, the two players may choose a higher rate in the range [f^ ; ]. This result happens
simply because of the following reason: if the issuer incurs a high operation cost, then it should attempt
to charge the acquirer a high interchange fee rate to o¤set its cost. As a response, the acquirer may
increase its merchant discount rate. This may raise the acquirers prot margin (i.e., the merchant
discount rate minus the interchange fee rate) if the interchange fee rate is unchanged. However, by
observing this, the issuer would accordingly bargain with the acquirer to increase its interchange fee
rate.
In addition, Theorem 2 shows that, if the xed fee F or the interest rate t is su¢ ciently large, then
the value of r1 is likely to be greater than the value of r2, and the NBS-based interchange fee rate
may be smaller than or equal to f^ . That is, a large value of F or t may induce the issuer to bargain
for a small interchange fee, because the issuers high revenue from consumers can compensate for the
reduction in the interchange fee. As Theorem 1 indicates, the acquirer responds by setting its merchant
discount rate as d1(f), which is increasing in f .
Remark 1 Using (3) and d(f) in Theorem 1 to compute the issuers prot I(f) = F + (f + t  
cI)  (F; )  R(d(f)), we nd that, when f^  f  , I(f) is strictly increasing in f . That is, if
the issuer determines the interchange fee rate by maximizing its own prot rather than by negotiating
with the acquirer, then the optimal rate may be f = . Consequently, the acquirer may also set its
merchant discount rate as d = . That is, if the interchange fee rate is determined by the issuer itself
rather than by the negotiation, then the acquirers prot would possibly be zero. This implies that the
negotiation may help increase the acquirers prot and entice the acquirer to stay in the credit card
network. J
3.3 Stackelberg Equilibrium
Substituting the NBS-characterized interchange fee rate f into (d(f); p2(d(f))), we can nd the
Stackelberg equilibrium (dS ; pS) as,
(dS ; pS) =
(
(; f= + c=[1  (F; )]g=2), if r1  r2 and 1(f1 )  2( ~f2),
(d(f1 ); p2(d(f1 ))), otherwise.
(8)
Next, we provide a numerical example to illustrate the NBS-characterized interchange fee rate, the
merchant discount rate and retail price in Stackelberg equilibrium.
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Example 1 Suppose that the issuers and the acquirers operation costs per dollar of credit card
transaction are cI = $0:005 and cA = $0:004, respectively. The parameters for the demand function
are assumed to be  = 100 and  = 0:7. In addition, the merchants acquisition cost is c = $120; the
xed fee and the interest rate for the credit card are F = $15 and t = 0:002 per dollar of credit card
transaction. For all numerical examples in this paper, we specify the percentage of the merchants sales
revenue attributed to the credit card transactions as,
(F; ) = 1    exp( 2F ), (9)
where i > 0 (for i = 1; 2) are two parameters that are selected such that (F; ) 2 [0; 1]. It is obvious
that the above function (F; ) satises the property that @(F; )=@F  0 and @(F; )=@  0. In
this example, we assume that 1 = 10, 2 = 0:15, and  = 0:6, which means that (F; ) = 0:63.
According to Theorem 2, we nd that the NBS-characterized interchange fee rate is f = 4:31%.
Then, using (8), we obtain the Stackelberg merchant discount rate as dS = 15:56%, and the Stackelberg
retail price of the product as pS = $137:98. C
4 The Cooperative Game Analysis
In this section, we allow the merchant to negotiate with the acquirer and the issuer for the interchange
fee rate and the merchant discount rate. This is di¤erent from Section 3 in which the merchant cannot
bargain with other players over the rates. Correspondingly, we develop a three-player cooperative
game to characterize the negotiation among the issuer, the acquirer, and the merchant, assuming that
(i) players can communicate with each other and form coalitions with other players and (ii) players
can make side payments to other players; see von Neumann and Morgenstern [45] and Stra¢ n [40].
Note that the cooperative game theory with n  3 players concerns the allocation of prot surplus or
cost savings among the n players who cooperate to form a grand coalition and achieve the surplus or
savings.
In the credit card network, the issuer, the acquirer, and the merchant can join the three-player
grand coalition and achieve a system-wide prot generated from the credit card business. To assure
the stability of the grand coalition i.e., the willingness of three players to cooperate for the credit card
business, we should construct a three-player cooperative game (in the characteristic function form) and
solve it for a fair allocation scheme. But, for our problem, we note that an allocation scheme among
the three players is attributed to the interchange fee rate and the merchant discount rate in the grand
coalition. For example, a higher value of the interchange fee rate results in more allocation to the
issuer; similarly, increasing the merchant discount rate may raise the allocation to the acquirer. That
is, given specic values of the two rates, we can compute the corresponding allocation scheme.
Next, we provide an approach to nd the rates assuring that the grand coalition is stable; for similar
approaches, see, e.g., Petrosjan and Zaccour [30], Sexton [36], etc. Specically, in order to nd the
negotiated rates for the credit card network, we should consider the following two steps:
Step 1: Construct a cooperative game given the rates in the grand coalition. In this step,
we construct a three-player cooperative game with the characteristic values in terms of the inter-
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change fee rate and the merchant discount rate in the grand coalition, which are assumed to be
given.
Step 2: Search for the rates that assure the stability of the grand coalition. We solve the co-
operative game to nd a fair allocation scheme and the corresponding rates, assuring that the
grand coalition is stable. We rst derive the conditions for the non-empty core, in which each
point represents a fair allocation scheme. In order to nd a unique solution, we then compute
Shapley value and the corresponding rates for the cooperative game. Note that (i) Shapley value-
based rates may not satisfy the conditions that assure the non-emptiness of the core, and (ii)
Shapley value may not be in the core even if the core is non-empty. Thus, we need to examine
whether or not Shapley value can be used to nd the rates that result in the stability of the
grand coalition. If Shapley value cannot assure that the grand coalition is stable, then we con-
sider the nucleolus and the globally-optimal solution that maximizes the total prot in the grand
coalition, which must exist in a non-empty core. For the nucleolus-based rates, we shall develop
an algorithm to nd the rates satisfying the conditions for the non-emptiness of the core.
Following the above two steps, we next develop a three-player cooperative game, and derive an
interchange fee rate and a merchant discount rate that result in a fair allocation scheme assuring the
stability of the grand coalition.
4.1 The Three-Player Cooperative Game Given the Rates in the Grand Coalition
To develop a cooperative game with three or more players, we need to compute the characteristic values
of all possible coalitions. Note that the characteristic value of a coalition is the minimum prot that
all members in the coalition can jointly achieve by using their own e¤orts only (von Neumann and
Morgenstern [45]). For our three-player cooperative game, the possible coalitions are (i) the empty
coalition f?g in which no player joins the credit card network; (ii) three single-player coalitions fig
(i = M;A; I) in which only rm i is involved in the credit card business; (iii) three two-player coalitions
fijg (i; j = M;A; I, i 6= j), which represent the coalitions each involving rms i and j for the credit
card business; and (iv) the three-player (grand) coalition fMAIg in which all of three players cooperate
to implement the credit card business.
Let v(S) denote the characteristic value of the coalition S. Our three-player cooperative game
in the characteristic-function form can be then written as: v(?); v(M), v(A), v(I); v(MI), v(MA),
v(AI); and v(MAI). Note that v(?) = 0 since the prot generated by the empty coalition is naturally
zero. We also nd from the practice that the acquirer and the issuer, which are two banks, cannot
participate in the retailing business. Therefore, if the merchant does not join the credit card network,
then either the acquirer or the issuer or both of them cannot achieve any prot from the credit card
business; that is, v(A) = v(I) = v(AI) = 0. However, any coalition involving the merchant may gain
a prot generated from consumer purchase with credit cards. The characteristic values v(M), v(MI),
v(MA), and v(MAI) are calculated as given in Table 1, where   1 denotes the scale parameter
for the acquiring-related operation cost of the merchant and the issuer in acting as an acquirer;
and   1 denotes the scale parameter for the issuing-related operation cost of the merchant and the
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acquirer in acting as an issuer.Moreover, in Table 1, dS is the Stackelberg equilibrium-characterized
merchant discount rate in the two-stage game setting, as given in Section 3; fMI and dMA denote
the negotiated interchange fee rate and merchant discount rate in the coalitions fMIg and fMAg,
respectively. For details about our calculation, see online Appendix C.
For the three-player cooperative game, we need to clarify the role of the acquirer, which is a nancial
rm serving the merchant. This is important since, in practice, some large merchants (e.g., JUSCO,
Tesco, etc.) have their own banks, thus being able to operate the acquiring business itself. That is,
the merchant could act as an acquirer in addition to mainly participating in the retailing business. It
then follows that we may not need a nancial rm as the acquirer in the game, and the characteristic
values v(MI) and v(MAI) may be identical. Actually, we can nd from a number of practices that, in
todays credit card networks, it is still common and necessary to have a separate nancial rm as
the acquirer, and v(MI) and v(MAI) are unlikely to be identical, because of the following two reasons.
1. In practice, if a large merchant possessing the nancial function is willing to serve as an acquirer,
then it, as usual, also decides to act as an issuer by issuing credit cards to consumers. This
case corresponds to the coalition fMg, in which the merchant operates the credit card network
by itself. Such an operation mainly stems from the merchants motivations for the delivery
of convenience to consumers and the improvement of protability. The real examples include
JUSCO and Tesco, as explained in online Appendix C.1.
2. In the retailing industry, most merchants including a number of large merchants such as Wal-
Mart and Sears (which sold its retail credit card business to the Citibank in 2003) do not
participate in the nancial operations, but focus on their retailing operations and cooperate with
one or two external nancial rms acting as the acquirer and the issuer. For example, Wal-Mart,
GE Money Bank which serves Wal-Mart as an acquirer, and the Citibank which issues the
Citibank credit cards to consumers who can use the cards to shop at Wal-Mart.
From the above, we conclude that (i) a separate nancial rm as an acquirer widely exists in
reality, because most merchants do not have their own banks, and (ii) most of the merchants with the
nancial functions usually undertake both the acquiring and the issuing operations rather than only
the acquiring business.
We note from Table 1 that, in the coalition fMg where the network density is M which is smaller
than , the merchants net operation cost for the credit card business cA + cI   t may not be less
than the Stackelberg equilibrium merchant discount fee dS , which is the costof the merchant in the
two-stage game setting. If cA + cI   t < dS , then, because (F; M ) < (F; ), the retail price pS
and the merchants prot M (pS) in the traditional setting are smaller than the retail price pM1 and
the merchants prot M1(p
M1) when the merchant acts alone in the credit card business, respectively.
Otherwise, if cA + cI   t  dS , then pS and M (pS) may be greater than pM1 and M1(pM1),
respectively, which depends on the value of the xed fee F and the di¤erence between (F; M ) and
(F; ). That is, when cA + cI   t < dS , the merchant should have an incentive to undertake the
credit card business instead of outsourcing such a business to the acquirer and the issuer. Since
cA + cI < d
S , as discussed in Section 3, the xed fee F , the interest rate t, the network density M ,
and parameters  and  play important roles in a¤ecting the merchants willingness to hold the credit
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Coalition Characteristic Value Remark
fMg
v(M) = max[M (pS);M1 (p
M1 )]
= max

[1  (F; )dS ]
4



  c
1  (F; )dS
2
;
F +
[1  (F; M )(cA + cI   t)]
4




  c
1  (F; M )(cA + cI   t)
2
The merchant may operate in the two-
stage game setting with the prot M (pS),
or may operate itself for the acquiring
and issuing business (in addition to its own
retailing business) with the prot M1 (p
M1 ).
Example: JUSCO (M)/AEON JUSCO
credit cards; Tesco/Clubcard Credit Card
fMIg
v(MI) = F +
1 + (F; )(t  cI   cA)
4


2

+
c2
[1  (F; )fMI ]2

  c
2




+
(F; )c(fMI + t  cI   cA)
[1  (F; )fMI ]2

The issuer operates for the acquiring
business in addition to its own issuing
business; and the merchant operates
for the retailing business. The interchange
fee rate fMI results from the negotiation
between the issuer and the merchant.
Example: Sears (M) and Citibank (I)/
Citibank credit card
fMAg
v(MA) = F +
1 + (F; )(t  cA   cI)
4


2

+
c2
[1  (F; )dMA]2

  c
2




+
(F; )c(dMA + t  cA   cI)
[1  (F; )dMA]2

The acquirer operates for the issuing
business in addition to its own acquiring
business; and the merchant operates for
the retailing business. The merchant
discount rate dMA results from the negotiation
between the acquirer and the merchant.
Example: The Gap Inc. (M) and GE Money Bank (A)
/Gap credit card
fMAIg
v(MAI) = F +

  c
1  (F; )d

(F; )(t  cI   cA)
4
+
1
4



+
c
1  (F; )d

  c
2

The merchant, the acquirer, and the issuer
operate for the retailing, the acquiring,
and issuing business, respectively.
Example: Wal-Mart (M), GE Money Bank (A),
and Citibank (I)/Citibank credit card
Table 1: The characteristic values v(M), v(MI), v(MA), and v(MAI) for the three-player cooperative
game. Note that, in the characteristic value v(M), the retail price in the two-stage game setting is
pS = f= + c=[1   (F; )dS ]g=2 and the retail price in the coalition fMg is pM1 = f= + c=[1  
(F; M )(cA + cI   t)]g=2.
card business.
When the values of F and t are given, we nd that, if the merchant is su¢ ciently e¢ cient in the
credit card business such that cA + cI   t < dS , then the merchant should be inclined to operate the
credit card business rather than to subcontract the nancial service out to the acquirer and the issuer.
Noting that, in practice, the majority of merchants are specialized in the retailing service rather than
the nancial service, we conclude that the large-scale merchants which include, e.g., JUSCO, as an
example for the coalition fMg may be likely to consider the credit card business, whereas the other
merchants (especially, small-scale merchants) may have to rely on the acquirer and the issuer as in the
two-stage game setting. Note that the largemerchants are dened as those who can operate with
su¢ ciently small values of  and ; and the smallmerchants are those with large values of  and .
We also note that small merchants may increase the xed fee F and the interest rate t, in order
to act alone in credit card transactions without cooperating with the acquirer and the issuer in the
traditional setting. Specically, if the merchant charges the credit card consumers a higher interest
rate, then the retail price pM1 can be reduced and the condition that cA + cI   t < dS may be still
satised even if  and  are not su¢ ciently small. Moreover, the merchant can increase the xed fee
F which also results in an increase in its retail price, assuring that M1(p
M1)  M (pS). Hence,
to deal with the credit card operations, the small merchants may need to raise the xed fee and the
interest rate, and also to reduce its retail price to compensate credit card consumers for their higher
credit card costs.
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In addition, the negotiated interchange fee rate fMI in the coalition fMIg and the negotiated
merchant discount rate dMA in the coalition fMAg are smaller than the Stackelberg equilibrium-based
merchant discount rate dS in the two-stage game setting. Our analysis in online Appendix C indicates
that fMI  cI + cA   t and dMA  cA + cI   t.
4.2 The Analysis of the Three-Player Cooperative Game for the Rates Assuring
the Stability of the Grand Coalition
We use the solution concepts of Shapley value and the nucleolus to nd a unique interchange fee rate
and a unique merchant discount rate that result in a fair scheme of allocating the prot v(MAI) among
the three players. Before we calculate the rates, we rst investigate whether our cooperative game in
the characteristic-function form is superadditive and convex.
A three-player cooperative game G is superadditive if v(C1 [ C2)  v(C1) + v(C2) for any two
disjoint coalitions C1 and C2 [40]. Moreover, the game is convex and superadditive if its characteristic
function is supermodular (Driessen [14] and Topkis [43]). For our problem, the characteristic function
of our three-player cooperative game is supermodular if v(S [ T ) + v(S \ T )  v(S) + v(T ), for all
S; T  N [38].
4.2.1 Supermodularity and the Core
We begin by deriving a su¢ cient condition under which our cooperative game is supermodular.
Theorem 3 If the merchant discount rate d is negotiated such that v(MAI) v(MA)  v(MI) v(M),
then our three-player cooperative game is supermodular. 
In the su¢ cient condition given by the above theorem, v(MI)   v(M) means the additional
prot generated when the issuer participates in the credit card business by undertaking both the
issuer- and the acquiring-related operations. Moreover, v(MAI)  v(MA) represents the additional
prot generated by the participation of the issuer who only operates the issuer-related business while the
acquirer exists in the credit card network. That is, the su¢ cient condition in Theorem 3 implies that the
issuer, the acquirer, and the merchant can jointly achieve a higher prot from the credit card business
(i.e., the game is supermodular and thus superadditive), if the issuers contributionis greater when
the acquirer serves the credit card network than when the acquirer is not involved in such a business.
Furthermore, one may note that the su¢ cient condition that v(MAI)  v(MA)  v(MI)  v(M) can
be equivalently re-written as v(MAI)  v(MI)  v(MA)  v(M). Using our above argument, we can
also conclude that the three rms can enjoy a higher system-wide prot, if the acquirers contribution
is greater when the issuer exists in the credit card network than when the issuer is not involved.
In addition to the above, we nd that the merchant should be always involved in the credit card busi-
ness, even though both the issuer and the acquirer are important to the protability and e¢ ciency of
the credit card network. The reason is given as follows: if the merchant does not join the network,
then both the issuer and the acquirer cannot gain any prot from the credit card business since they,
as two nancial rms, could not play as the role of an merchant to realize the sale revenue in the
retailing market.
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Remark 2 The merchants participation in the credit card network is signicantly important to the
success of the network. Moreover, the issuer and the acquirer may need to have su¢ cient expertise in
the issuing- and the acquiring-related business, respectively, in order to make the network-wide prot
higher than when the merchant operates the credit card business by itself or delegates the business
to either the issuer or the acquirer. Theorem 3 implies that the issuer and the acquirer should both
operate in the credit card network, in order to improve the protability of the network. That is, the
popularity of the credit card service in the nancial market could be important to the success of the
recent U.S. bill H.R. 2695, in which the merchant is encouraged to participate in the credit card
network for the negotiation of the interchange fee rate and the merchant discount rate. J
When our cooperative game is supermodular, it has a non-empty core in which there exists a set
of fair allocation schemes each assuring the stability of the grand coalition fMAIg [16]. Letting yi
denote the prot allocated to rm i, i 2 N = fM;A; Ig, we can call a proper allocation scheme
y  (yM ; yA; yI) where yM = M4(d), yA = A4(d), and yI = I4(f) an imputation for our
game G = (N; v(:)), if the scheme satises the following two properties: (i) individual rationality, i.e.,
yi  v(i), for all i 2 N ; and (ii) collective rationality, i.e.,
P
i2N yi = v(MAI) [40]. The core is the set
of all undominated imputations (fair allocation schemes) (yM ; yA; yI) such that
P
i2T yi  v(T ) for all
coalitions T  N = fM;A; Ig.
Even though a supermodular game must have a non-empty core, we cannot conclude that the core
is empty for the non-supermodular game. In the following theorem, we provide necessary and su¢ cient
conditions under which our cooperative game has a non-empty core.
Theorem 4 The core of our cooperative game is non-empty if and only if fMI   cA  f and f +
dMA + t  cI  d  min(dMA; fMI). 
The above theorem implies that, as the merchant joins the grand coalition fMAIg and bargains with
the acquirer and the issuer over the merchant discount rate and the interchange fee rate, the negotiated
interchange fee rate and merchant discount rate are smaller than dMA and fMI , respectively. Noting
from Section 4.1 that both dMA and fMI are smaller than dS , we nd that the merchant discount
rate negotiated by the issuer, the acquirer, and the merchant is smaller than dS in the two-stage game
setting. But, we cannot analytically show that the interchange fee rate is smaller than f in the two-
stage game setting. Though, all numerical examples that we shall provide later can demonstrate that
the interchange fee rate is reduced as a result of the negotiation among the issuer, the acquirer, and
the merchant.
As Theorem 4 indicates, the interchange fee rate f must be greater than or equal to fMI cA. We
learn from Section C.2 that fMI is the rate paid by the merchant to the issuer in the coalition fMIg,
where the issuer absorbs the unit cost cA in undertaking the acquiring-related operations. This implies
that fMI cA represents the issuers unit net gainresulting from its own (issuer-related) operations.
Thus, the condition that fMI   cA  f assures that the issuer is willing to join the grand coalition
fMAIg. Similarly, in the two-player coalition fMAg, the acquirers unit net gain resulting from
its own (acquiring-related) operations is dMA + t   cI . To assure that the acquirer has an incentive
to join the grand coalition fMAIg, we should determine the merchant discount rate d such that the
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acquirers unit net gain (d  f) in fMAIg is no less than dMA + t  cI , i.e., f + dMA + t  cI  d.
Note that the merchant pays the rates dMA and fMI in the two-player coalitions fMAg and fMIg,
respectively. In order to entice the merchant to stay in the grand coalition, we should choose the
merchant discount rate that is lower than both dMA and fMI , i.e., d  min(dMA; fMI). According to
the above discussion, we draw the following insights.
Remark 3 The grand coalition is more likely to be stable, if the degree of division of labouramong
the three rms (i.e., the merchant, the acquirer, or the issuer) in the credit card network is higher.
The division of labour is the specialization of cooperative labourin specic, circumscribed tasks, see,
e.g., [41]. In our credit card network, the degree of division of labour reects the specializations of the
merchant, the acquirer, or the issuer in their retailing, acquiring, and issuing operations, respectively.
When the degree of division of labour in the network is higher, each rm is stronger and more special-
izedin its own operation; that is, the acquirer and the merchant in the coalition fMAgmay operate
the credit card issuing business more ine¢ ciently, and the issuer and the merchant in the coalition
fMIg may operate the credit card acquiring business more ine¢ ciently. Note that the scale parameter
 reects the operation e¢ ciency of the issuer and the merchant in acting as an acquirer;and, the
scale parameter  reects the operation e¢ ciency of the acquirer and the merchant in acting as an
issuer.Therefore, a higher degree of division of labour should result in higher values of  and .
Theorem 4 indicates that, in the credit card network, all of the three rms are willing to join the
grand coalition, if and only if the deviation of any one player from the grand coalition shall make the
remaining two players worse o¤. That is, if each two-player coalition can achieve a signicantly high
prot (characteristic value), then the grand coalition is unlikely to be stable. Recall that the prot
of the coalition fAIg is zero. From online Appendices C.2 and C.3, we nd that the prots of the
coalitions fMIg and fMAg could be small if the values of the scale parameters   1 and   1 are
signicantly high, respectively. Therefore, in the credit card network with the high values of  and ,
neither the two-player coalition fMIg nor fMAg would be stable and instead, the grand coalition is
likely to be stable. That is, if the merchant, the acquirer, and the issuer are more specialized in their
own operations for the credit card business resulting in a higher degree of division of labour, then it
should be more costly for the issuer and the merchant (the acquire and the merchant) to take the role
of an acquirer (issuer), the value of  () is higher, and the grand coalition is more likely to be
stable. J
The above remark implies that the recent U.S. bill H.R. 2695 should be more e¤ective, if, in
major U.S. credit card networks, the degree of division of labour is higher, and the nancial rms
and the merchants are more specialized in their own operations. As discussed in Section 3, in 2007,
the percentage of the transactions by the nancial rms mainly acting for the acquiring operation is
around 79.9%, and the percentage of the transactions by the nancial rms mainly acting in the issuing
operation is around 83.7%. Moreover, there is no merchant on either the list of top 10 acquirers or the
list of top 10 issuers, which was listed by Prager et al. [32]. The above fact implies that the degree of
division of labour in the U.S. credit card business is high. Thus, we can conclude that the recent U.S.
bill H.R. 2695 should be e¤ective as merchants, acquirers, and issuers should be willing to form a
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stable grand coalition and negotiate the merchant discount rate and the interchange fee rate.
In addition, we nd from Theorem 4 that a low value of the interest rate t is likely to result in the
stability of the grand coalition and the e¤ectiveness of the U.S. bill H.R. 2695.Letting
  f(d; f)jf + dMA + t  cI  d  min(dMA; fMI) and fMI   cA  fg, (10)
we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1 If  > 1, then the set  is non-empty and thus, the interchange fee rate and the merchant
discount rate in  can assure that the corresponding allocation scheme is in the core and the grand
coalition fMAIg is stable. However, if  = 1, then both the set  and the core are empty. 
In this paper,  is assumed to be greater than 1, because, as discussed previously, the acquirer/merchant
incurs a higher operation cost in acting as an issuer.Moreover, noting from Section 4.1 that dMA < dS
and fMI < dS , we nd that dS > min(dMA; fMI) and thus, the rates (f; dS) in the two-stage game
(traditional) setting which are given as in Section 3 do not belong to the set . That is, if the
merchant, the acquirer, and the issuer choose the rates (f; dS) in the three-player cooperative game
setting, then the core is empty and the grand coalition is not stable.
4.2.2 The Unique Merchant Discount and Interchange Fee Rates
Since the core includes many allocation schemes rather than only a unique scheme, one may need to
make a decision on which imputation in the core to be chosen to allocate the prot v(MAI). Shapley
value [37] and the nucleolus [35] are the two most commonly-used solutions in cooperative game theory.
We thus apply both of them to derive a unique allocation solution and its corresponding rates d and f .
Moreover, the three players may desire to choose the globally-optimal rates that maximize their total
prot v(MAI). Accordingly, in addition to Shapley value and nucleolus, we also compute the globally
optimal rates.
Shapley value For a n-player cooperative game, the Shapley value for player i is computed as
i =
P
i2T (jT j   1)!(n   jT j)![v(T )   v(T   fig)]=(n!), where T denotes a possible coalition that the
rm i joins, and jT j is the size of T . It is a unique, monotonic solution (Megiddo [28] and Young [49]),
as the prot allocated to each player increases if the prot achieved by each possible coalition increases.
Using the above formula, we can write the unique allocation scheme in terms of Shapley value for
our cooperative game G = (N; v()) as,8>>>><>>>>:
M =
2v(MAI) + 2v(M) + v(MA) + v(MI)
6
;
A =
2v(MAI)  v(M) + v(MA)  2v(MI)
6
;
I =
2v(MAI)  v(M) + v(MI)  2v(MA)
6
.
Note that M , A, and I correspond to the prots allocated to the merchant, the acquirer, and the
issuer in the grand coalition M4(d), A4(d), and I4(f) given in (17) and (18), respectively. By
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solving the equations fM4(d) = M and A4(d) = Ag, we can nd the Shapley value-characterized
merchant discount rate dSP and interchange fee rate fSP . Note that we do not need to consider the
equation that I4(f
SP ) = I , because M4(d
SP ) + A4(d
SP ) + I4(f
SP ) = M + A + I = v(MAI).
However, the Shapley value-characterized dSP and fSP may not belong to the set ; thus, when dSP
and fSP are adopted, the core may be empty and the grand coalition fMAIg may be unstable.
To illustrate the above, we next provide two examples one with an empty core and the other
with a non-empty core when the Shapley value is used to allocate v(MAI) among the merchant, the
acquirer, and the issuer.
Example 2 We consider a three-product case and use the parameter values given in Example 1.
We also assume that  = 15 and  = 12. In addition, for the coalition fMg, the density of the
merchants network in (9) is M = 0:5. According to Section 4.1, we nd that (i) for the coalition fMg,
v(M) = 51:44; (ii) for the coalition fMIg, fMI = 6:3% and v(MI) = 88:70; and (iii) for the coalition
fMAg, dMA = 6:2% and v(MA) = 69:24. Solving the equation set fM4(d) = M and A4(d) = Ag
yields dSP = 2:75% and fSP = 0:07%, and v(MAI) = 101:38. Since fSP < fMI   cA = 0:3%,
(dSP ; fSP ) is not in the set . Therefore, as Corollary 1 indicates, the core is empty and the grand
coalition fMAIg is thus unstable. C
We then provide another example to calculate the Shapley value-based rates that can result in the
stability of the grand coalition.
Example 3 We re-consider Example 2 but assume that cA = 0:004, cI = $0:0045 and  = 15.
Similarly, we nd that v(M) = 48:69; v(MI) = 68:97, and v(MA) = 65:31; and, fMI = 6:25%
and dMA = 6:95%. We then obtain the rates dSP = 2:99% and fSP = 0:33%. It follows that
v(MAI) = 101:57. Since fSP + dMA + t   cI = 0:73%  dSP  min(dMA; fMI) = 6:25% and
fSP > fMI   cA = 0:25%, (dSP ; fSP ) belongs to the set  and thus, the core is non-empty. That is,
if the merchant, the acquirer, and the issuer choose dSP and fSP , then the grand coalition fMAIg is
stable and the three players are willing to cooperate for the credit card business. C
The Nucleolus Since the Shapley value-characterized rates (dSP ; fSP ) may not be in the set , we
use another common concept the nucleolus to nd a unique pair of the rates. For a three-player
cooperative game, the nucleolus solution is dened as a 3-tuple imputation x = (xM ; xA; xI) such that
the excess (unhappiness) eS(x) = v(S)  
P
i2S xi of any possible coalition S cannot be lowered
without increasing any other greater excess [35]. That is, the nucleolus solution makes the largest
unhappiness of the coalitions as small as possible, or, equivalently, minimizes the worst inequity. A
most common approach to nd the nucleolus is the sequential linear programming (LP) method that
is based on lexicographic ordering (Maschler, Peleg, and Shapley [26]). Using the LP approach, we
rst reduce the largest excess maxfeS(x); for all S  Ng as much as possible, then decrease the
second largest excess as much as possible, and continue this process until the 3-tuple imputation x is
determined. Even though the nucleolus has been proved to always exist in the core as long as the core
is non-empty [40], we have to solve a series of linear problems to nd it. For a recent detailed discussion
on the calculation of the nucleolus, see Leng and Parlar [22]. For our game, a LP algorithm can be
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developed as given in online Appendix D. We next provide two examples to illustrate the calculation
of the nucleolus-characterized rates dn and fn.
Example 4 We consider the parameter values given in Example 2. Using the algorithm provided
in online Appendix D, we compute the nucleolus-characterized rates as (dn; fn) = (3:53%; 0:45%),
which can result in the stability of the grand coalition. Next, we adopt the parameter values used in
Example 3 to nd the nucleolus-characterized rates as dn = 3:58% and fn = 0:44%. Comparing the
nucleolus-characterized solution (dn; fn) with the Shapley value-characterized solution (dSP ; fSP ) =
(2:99%; 0:33%) in Example 3, we nd that the nucleolus solution suggests a higher merchant discount
rate and also a higher interchange fee rate. Since dn   fn = 3:14% > dSP   fSP = 2:66, both the
acquirer and the issuer should prefer the nucleolus to the Shapley value. C
Globally-Optimal Rates We now investigate a centralized case that the merchant, the acquirer,
and the issuer jointly determine optimal merchant discount and interchange fee rates to maximize their
total prot v(MAI), which is given as in (19). We note that v(MAI) is dependent on the merchant
discount rate d but independent of the interchange fee rate f , which is attributed to the fact that the
interchange fee calculated as f  (F; )R is the issuers revenue but is the acquirers cost. But,
to nd the globally optimal merchant discount rate, we should maximize v(MAI) subject to d 2 ,
where  is dependent on the interchange fee rate f , as dened in (10). Note that the constraint d 2 
is imposed to assure the stability of the grand coalition fMAIg.
Theorem 5 Given the interchange fee rate f , the globally optimal dG(f) maximizing v(MAI) subject
to d 2  is obtained as dG(f) = f + dMA + t  cI . 
From the above theorem, we learn that, when the three players decide to maximize their total
prot v(MAI) for a given value of f , then the globally optimal merchant discount rate dG must be no
greater than the nucleolus-characterized rate dn, i.e., dG  dn, because dG(f) = f+dMA+t cI  dn.
Since the interchange fee rate f is negotiated between the acquirer and the issuer, the optimal rate fG
can be obtained by solving the following constrained maximization problem: maxffMI cA 
G(f) =
A4(d
G(f))  I4(f). Similar to Theorem 2, G(f) can be shown to be a quasi-concave function.
But, due to the intractable complexity, we cannot nd the closed-form solution for fG but instead
write fG = arg maxffMI cA 
G(f). As a result, the globally optimal merchant discount rate dG =
dG(fG) = fG + dMA + t  cI .
Example 5 We rst use the parameter values given in Example 2 where the rates in terms of Shapley
value cannot assure the stability of the grand coalition to compute the globally optimal rates as
(dG; fG) = (0:6%; 0:3%). Next, using the parameter values used in Example 3, we nd (dG; fG) =
(0:65%; 0:25%). We learn from the above results that, in order to maximize v(MAI), the three rms
should reduce the globally-optimal interchange fee and merchant discount rates to fMI   cA and
fMI + dMA + t  cA   cI , respectively. In fact, we nd that such a result holds for a large number
of numerical examples. C
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5 Further Discussions
In this section, we investigate a two-player case for a credit card network where the acquirer and the
issuer are the same rm, and examine the robustness of our results (obtained in Sections 3 and 4)
when the linear price-dependent demand function (specied in Section 3.1.1) is replaced with a logistic
function.
5.1 Discussion on Implications for the Two-Player Games with a Single Firm Act-
ing as Both the Acquirer and the Issuer
We investigate a two-player case for a credit card network where the acquirer and the issuer are the
same rm. We learn from Prager et al. [32] that, even though most of top acquirers and issuers are
di¤erent rms, some rms (e.g., Bank of America) still operate for both the acquiring and the issuing
business. Motivated by this practice, we now assume that a single rm acts as both the acquirer and
the issuer, and discuss possible changes on the retail price and the merchant discount rate.
When a single nancial rm takes both the acquiring and the issuing operations, there is no inter-
change fee because such a fee is a side payment from an acquirer to an issuer only when the acquirer
and the issuer are separate rms in the credit card business. Thus, for a credit card network involving
a merchant and a single nancial rm, we should only need to determine the merchants retail price
p and the merchant discount rate d. Similar to Section 3, we also consider the traditional setting to
analyze a non-cooperative game where the merchant does not bargain with the nancial rm over the
merchant discount rate; and, similar to Section 4, we consider a two-player cooperative game where
the merchant negotiates the rate d with the nancial rm. Note that the analysis of the above games
should be much simpler than that when three players (the merchant, the acquirer, and the issuer)
operate in the credit card network. Hence, for the two-player case, we do not solve the two games but
instead discuss the implications when a single rm acts for both the acquiring and the issuing business.
In the traditional setting where the merchant does not negotiate with the nancial rm about the
value of d, the credit card operation can be described as a sequential game where the nancial rm
determines and announces the rate d as a leader and the merchant then responds as a follower by
making its retail pricing decision. This game is very similar to the sequential game in the second stage
of our two-stage game problem in Section 3. Specically, for the two-player case, the merchants best-
response pricing analysis is the same as that in Section 3.1.1. However, the single nancial rms prot
function should be written as F +(d+t cI cA)(F; )R(d), which is similar to the acquirers prot in
(5) for the three-player case involving the interchange fee rate f > cI . We learn from Theorem 1 that
the optimal merchant discount rate is increasing in f . This implies that, in Stackelberg equilibrium,
the merchant discount rate for the two-player case should be smaller than that for the three-player
case; and, the retail price is also smaller in the two-player case. The result reects the fact that the
nancial rms cost is reduced as a result of the absence of the interchange fee, and the rm and the
merchant can thus decrease their merchant discount rate and retail price to increase the sales and
improve their protability.
In the cooperative game setting where the merchant and the nancial rm negotiate the rate d.
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Di¤erent from our three-player cooperative game in Section 3, we should need to investigate the two-
player cooperative game using the concept of NBS [29]. Such an analysis is very similar to our analysis
for the coalition fMAg in the three-player cooperative game, which is given in online Appendix C.3.
Specically, we can easily nd the result for the two-player cooperative case by simply replacing the
parameter  for the coalition fMAg in the three-player case with the value of 1. Similarly using our
argument in online Appendix C.3, we can conclude that, for the two-player case, the merchant discount
rate in the cooperative game setting is not higher than that in the non-cooperative (sequential) game
setting.
Recall from Theorem 4 that, for the three-player case, the merchant discount rate that is negotiated
among the merchant, the acquirer, and the issuer is no less than f + dMA + t   cI but no greater
than min(dMA; fMI), assuring the stability of the grand coalition. Similar to online Appendix C.3, we
can nd that the merchant discount rate for the two-player case is greater than cA + cI   t, which is
smaller than f + dMA + t  cI as shown in the proof of Theorem 5. However, we cannot immediately
conclude that, when the merchant bargains over d with the nancial rm for the two-player case, the
resulting merchant discount rate is smaller than or greater than that in the three-player case.
The above indicates that, when a single nancial rm performs both the acquiring and the issuing
tasks in a credit card network, the participation of the merchant for the rate negotiation which is in
gear with the recent U.S. bill H.R. 2695 will result in a decrease in the merchant discount rate.
Next, we provide an example to illustrate our above argument.
Example 6 We consider the parameter values in Example 1. For the two-stage game where the
merchant discount rate is determined by the nancial rm rather than negotiated by the merchant and
the nancial rm, we substitute the merchants sales revenue R(d) in (3) into the nancial rms prot
function F + (d + t   cI   cA)(F; )R(d), and maximize it subject to d   where  is given as in
(2). The Stackelberg equilibrium-characterized merchant discount rate for the two-player setting can
be obtained as dS = 13:77%, which is smaller than the merchant discount rate 15:56% in Example 1
where the acquirer and the issuer are two separate rms. The result is the same as our above discussion.
We calculate the merchant discount rate that is negotiated by the merchant and the nancial rm.
Similar to our calculation for the coalition fMAg, we nd that the NBS-characterized rate is 4:90%,
which is signicantly smaller than the above Stackelberg equilibrium dS = 13:77%. This important
result is the same as that in the three-player setting.
Next, we consider another example using the parameter values in Example 2. We nd that the
Stackelberg equilibrium dS = 13:75%, which is smaller than the equilibrium (i.e., 15:53%) in the three-
player setting. Moreover, we nd that the NBS-based rate is 4:87%, which is much smaller than the
Stackelberg equilibrium.
The above numerical results demonstrate that for the non-cooperative case, the Stackelberg equilibrium-
based merchant discount rate in the two-player setting is smaller than that in the three-player setting,
whereas for the cooperative case, the negotiated merchant discount rate in the two-player setting is
greater than that in the three-player setting. C
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5.2 Robustness of Major Results in the Presence of a Logistic Demand Function
We now examine whether or not our major results obtained in Sections 3 and 4 still hold, if we relax our
assumption on the linearity of the price-dependent demand function and instead consider the following
logistic demand function (see, e.g., Phillips [31]):
q0(p) = B  1
1 + exp(0 + 0p)
, (11)
where B represents the market size, and 0; 0 > 0 denote the price-independent and the price-
dependent parameters, respectively. Since both the two-stage and the cooperative game analyses
with the demand function in (11) are intractable, we perform subsequent numerical experiments with
the parameter values in (11) as B = 200, 0 = 0:03, and 0 = 0:07. The values of other parameters are
the same as those in Examples 1 and 2.
5.2.1 The Numerical Analysis for the Two-Stage Game with the Logistic Demand Func-
tion
We rst examine whether or not our results in Section 3 hold when the price-dependent demand function
is given as in (11). Recall from Section 3.1.1 that the merchant should compare its prots NCM (p) and
CM (p) in (1) to determine if consumers are allowed to shop with the credit card issued by the issuer.
To entice the merchant to accept the credit card, the acquirer should announce its merchant discount
rate d such that CM (p)  NCM (p). Noting that CM (p) is decreasing in d and NCM (p) is independent
of d, we nd that there must exist a cuto¤ level  which can be specied as in (2) when the demand
is linear such that the merchant benets from accepting credit card transactions and thus agrees on
the use of the credit card, if the merchant discount rate d is no greater than the cuto¤ level . The
above discussion implies that the result in Section 3.1.1 holds when the demand function is specied
as in (11).
Next, we examine the result in Remark 1. Using the values of parameters in Example 1, we compute
the interchange fee rate negotiated between the acquirer and the issuer as f = 5:95%, the Stackelberg
equilibrium-based merchant discount rate and retail price as dS = 17:00% and pS = $148:73. When
the interchange fee rate is determined by the issuer itself, we can calculate the resulting rate as f =
dS =  = 30:03%, which means that the acquirers prot margin is zero. The above result implies that
Remark 1 holds when the demand function is given as in (11).
5.2.2 The Numerical Analysis for the Cooperative Game with the Logistic Demand
Function
We begin by examining the result in Section 4.1. Using the values of parameters in Example 2, we nd
that cA + cI   t = 0:118 < dS = 0:17. We calculate the merchants maximum prot in the two-stage
game setting and that in the coalition fMg as M (pS) = $7:44 and M1(pM1) = $16:89. When we
increase the value of  from 15 to 20 and the value of  from 12 to 15, and decrease the value of F from
15 to 10, we nd that cA+cI  t = 0:153 > dS = 0:082, and M (pS) = $12:66 > M1(pM1) = $11:08.
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The above results imply that, if the values of  and  are higher and/or the value of F is lower, then the
merchant is more unlikely to operate the credit card business by itself. That is, our result in Section
4.1 also applies to the game with the logistic demand function as in (11).
Next, we investigate if Theorems 3 and 4 are applicable to the cooperative game with the logistic
demand function. The characteristic values of the game are calculated as follows: v(?) = v(A) =
v(I) = v(AI) = 0, v(M) = 16:89, v(MI) = 41:18, v(MA) = 32:90, and v(MAI) = 97:54. For the
game, the merchant discount and the interchange fee rates in terms of Shapley value are computed as
dSP = 6:92% and fSP = 2:37%. We can nd from Driessen [14] and Topkis [43] that the cooperative
game is supermodular. Noting that v(MAI)  v(MA) = 64:64 > v(MI)  v(M) = 24:29, we conclude
that Theorem 3 may hold for the game with the demand function in (11). The core of this cooperative
game is thus non-empty. We examine the su¢ cient and necessary condition in Theorem 4 as follows:
fMI   cA = 0:083   15  0:004 = 0:023  fSP = 0:0237, and fSP + dMA + t   cI = 0:0427 <
dSP = 0:0692 < min(dMA; fMI) = 0:077. This means that Theorem 4 also holds for the game with the
logistic function. We preform a great number of numerical experiments, and nd that Theorems 3 and
4 always apply to our game analysis, which should demonstrate the robustness of the two theorems.
In fact, one may note from our discussion in Section 4.2.1 that Theorems 3 and 4 could not largely
depend on the linearity property of our demand function.
In addition, we also nd that, for most cases, Shapley value cannot assure the stability of the grand
coalition. Therefore, we still calculate the nucleolus to represent the negotiated merchant discount and
interchange fee rates. For Examples 2 and 3, we use the algorithm provided in online Appendix D to
compute the nucleolus-characterized rates (dn; fn) as (8:43%; 2:60%) and (6:86%; 1:93%), respectively.
Similar to our discussion in Example 4, we compare the nucleolus (dn; fn) = (8:43%; 2:60%) and
Shapley value (dSP ; fSP ) = (6:92%; 2:37%), and nd that both the acquirer and the issuer should
prefer the nucleolus to the Shapley value.
Next, we calculate the globally-optimal rates that maximize the total prot v(MAI). For Examples
2 and 3, we nd that the optimal rates (dG; fG) as (4:31%; 2:31%) and (3:74%; 1:12%), respectively.
Our results indicate that Theorem 5 may not hold when the demand function is given in (11), which
is mainly attributed to the fact that Theorem 5 is dependent on the linearity of the demand function.
However, we nd that in the centralized setting, the merchant discount rate and the interchange fee
rate are both reduced; this is the same as what we nd from Example 5.
We also learn that, when a nancial rm performs both the acquiring and the issuing operations,
for Example 2, the merchant discount rate in Stackelberg equilibrium is dS = 15:22%, which is smaller
than the Stackelberg equilibrium-based rate in the three-player setting (17:00%). In addition, for the
cooperative case, the negotiated merchant discount rate in the two-player setting is 12:39%, which is
greater than that in the three-player setting (8:43%). It thus follows that our major results in Section
5.1 hold for the game with the logistic demand function.
Remark 4 From our numerical experiments, we learn that our major managerial insights based on
the linearity of the demand function still hold when we use the logistic demand function in (11), even
though Theorem 5 does not apply to the game analysis with the logistic demand function. In fact,
Theorem 5 is dependent on the linearity property of the demand function; but, the managerial insights
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resulting from Theorem 5 hold because in the centralized setting with the logistic function, both the
merchant discount rate and the interchange fee rate are both decreased. In conclusion, we nd that
our results in Sections 3 and 4 are robust in general. C
6 Summary and Concluding Remarks
This paper considers a credit card network involving an issuer, an acquirer, and a merchant who serves
consumers in a consumer market. For the network, we determine the interchange fee rate for the issuer,
the merchant discount rate for the acquirer, and the optimal retail price for the merchant in both a two-
stage game setting (where the merchant does not participate in the negotiation of the interchange fee
rate and the merchant discount rate) and a three-player cooperative game setting (where the merchant
is involved in the negotiation). For the former setting, we derive the NBS-characterized interchange
fee rate and the Stackelberg equilibrium-based merchant discount rate and retail price.
For the cooperative game setting, we calculate the characteristic values of all possible coalitions,
derive a su¢ cient condition for the supermodularity, and attain a necessary and su¢ cient condition
under which the core of our cooperative game is non-empty. The condition for the non-emptiness of the
core indicates that the issuer, the acquirer, and the merchant are willing to jointly determine the rates
if and only if the interchange fee rate is no smaller than a specic threshold and the merchant discount
rate falls in a specic range. We then apply Shapley value, the nucleolus, and the globally-optimal
solution to nd unique rates at which the merchant, the acquirer, and the issuer are all better o¤
by joining the credit card network. We show that both the nucleolus-characterized and the globally-
optimal rates can assure the stability of the grand coalition, whereas the Shapley value-characterized
rates are likely to make the grand coalition unstable. We also discuss the implications for two-player
games involving a merchant and a nancial rm who acts for both the acquiring and the issuing
operations.
Our major managerial insights are summarized as follows:
1. In the two-stage game setting, the acquirer should determine a merchant discount rate that is
no larger than a specic cuto¤ level [i.e.,  in (2)], in order to entice the merchant to accept the
transactions with credit cards. Otherwise, the merchant may not be willing to participate in the
credit card business.
2. In the two-stage game setting, if the interchange fee rate is determined by the issuer itself rather
than by the negotiation between the issuer and the acquirer, then the acquirer would not benet
from the credit card business. This implies that such a two-player negotiation can help entice
the acquirer to stay in the credit card network.
3. In the cooperative game setting, the largemerchants (e.g., JUSCO) which can also e¢ ciently
operate the acquiring and the issuing business may have an incentive to undertake the credit
card operations by itself. The other merchants (especially, small merchants) may have to
increase the xed fee and the interest rate, if they desire to act for the credit card business
by themselves. Otherwise, the small merchants have to only focus on the retailing service,
cooperating with the issuer and the acquirer as in the two-stage game setting.
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4. The merchants participation in the credit card network is signicantly important to the prof-
itability of the network. Moreover, the issuer and the acquirer may need to have su¢ cient
expertise in the issuing- and the acquiring-related business, respectively, in order to make the
network-wide prot higher than when the merchant operates the credit card business by itself or
delegates the business to either the issuer or the acquirer.
Moreover, the popularity of the credit card service in the nancial market would be important to
the success of the recent U.S. bill H.R. 2695,in which the merchant is encouraged to participate
in the credit card network for the negotiation of the interchange fee rate and the merchant discount
rate.
5. The interchange fee rate and the merchant discount rate in the cooperative game setting are
smaller than those in the two-stage game setting. This means that, as a result of implementing
the U.S. bill H.R. 2695,both rates are reduced, which shows that the bill should be e¤ective.
6. The grand coalition should be more likely to be stable, if the degree of division of labour in
the credit card business is higher and the issuer, the acquirer, and the merchant are all more
specialized in their own operations. As discussed in Section 4.2.1, in the United States, the degree
of division of labour in the credit card business is high, and thus, the recent U.S. bill H.R. 2695
should be e¤ective. In addition, a low value of the interest rate t is likely to result in the stability
of the grand coalition and the e¤ectiveness of the U.S. bill H.R. 2695.
In addition, we perform sensitivity analysis to examine the impacts of the credit card operation
costs (i.e., cA, cI ; , ) on the interchange fee rate and the merchant discount rate in the two-stage
and the three-player cooperative games. Through a large number of numerical experiments, we nd
that, for most cases, the Shapley value-characterized rates cannot assure the stability of the grand
coalition, and the globally-optimal interchange fee and merchant discount rates are equal to fMI   cA
and fMI + dMA + t   cA   cI , respectively. Thus, using the parameter values given in Example 2
as base values, we calculate the Stackelberg equilibrium-based rates for the two-stage game when the
merchant does not bargain over the rates and the nucleolus-characterized rates for the three-player
cooperative game when the merchant participates in the rate negotiation. We also show that our main
managerial results hold for the game with a logistic demand function.
According to our results given in online Appendix E, we nd that the interchange fee rate and
the merchant discount rate in the cooperative game are signicantly smaller than the Stackelberg
equilibrium rates in the two-stage game setting. We also learn that the acquirers and the issuers
unit operation costs (cA and cI) more signicantly impact the interchange fee rate and the merchant
discount rate in the cooperative game setting than in the two-stage game setting. The interchange fee
rate in the two-stage game setting is decreasing in the acquirers unit operation cost cA, whereas the
interchange fee rate in the cooperative game setting may not signicantly depend on the value of cA
when cA is su¢ ciently small (i.e., cA < 0:4). But, the merchant discount rate is always increasing in
cA in both the two-stage and the cooperative game settings.
In both the two-stage and the cooperative game settings, the interchange fee rate and the merchant
discount rate are increasing in the issuers unit operation cost cI . In the cooperative game setting,
the interchange fee rate may not signicantly depend on the value  which measures the per dollar
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operation cost absorbed by the merchant/issuer in acting as an acquirer when  is su¢ ciently small
(i.e.,  < 14); but, the merchant discount rate is increasing in . In addition, the parameter  which
measures the per dollar operation cost absorbed by the merchant/acquirer in acting as an issuer may
have no signicant impact on the interchange fee rate when  is su¢ ciently small (i.e.,  < 11:5).
In conclusion, we nd that the recent U.S. bill H.R. 2695 should be useful to reduce both the
interchange fee rate and the merchant discount rate. We have identied some important managerial
insights that could help improve the e¢ ciency of the credit card operations.
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Online Appendices
Interchange Fee Rate, Merchant Discount Rate, and Retail Price in a Credit Card
Network: A Game-Theoretic Approach
H. Guo, M. Leng, Y. Wang
Appendix A Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. Temporarily ignoring the constraint that f + cA  d  , we take the rst-
and second-order derivatives of A(d) in (5) w.r.t. d, and nd that
@A(d)
@d
=
(F; )
4

2

  c
2
[1  (F; )d]2

  [(F; )]
2c2(d  f   cA)
2[1  (F; )d]3 , (12)
@2A(d)
@d2
=   [(F; )]
2c2
2[1  (F; )d]3  
[(F; )]2c2
2[1  (F; )d]3

1 +
3(F; )(d  f   cA)
1  (F; )d

.
At the point(s) that satisfy the rst-order condition (i.e., @A(d)=@d = 0), we re-write the second-order
derivative @2A(d)=@d2 as,
@2A(d)
@d2

@A(d)=@d=0
=   [(F; )]
2
4[1  (F; )d]

32

+
c2
[1  (F; )d]2

 0.
This implies that A(d) is a quasi-concave function of the merchant discount rate d with a unique
maximizing value d1(f). Solving the rst-order condition (FOC) @A=@(d) = 0, we can obtain d1(f)
as a unique solution of the following equation:
2[1  (F; )d1(f)]3 = 2c2[1 + (F; )d1(f)  2(F; )(f + cA)]. (13)
Next, we consider the constraint that f + cA  d  . When d = f + cA, (12) becomes
@A(d)
@d

d=f+cA
=
(F; )
4

2

  c
2
[1  (F; )(f + cA)]2

,
which is non-negative as 2  2c2=[1  (F; )d]2. It then follows that f + cA  d1(f). When d = ,
(12) becomes
@A(d)
@d

d=
=
(F; )
4

2

  c
2
[1  (F; )]2

  [(F; )]
2c2(  f   cA)
2[1  (F; )]3 ,
which is strictly increasing in f , and is equal to zero iif f = f^ , where f^ is given in (6). As a result,
when f  f^ , then @A(d)=@djd=  0 and d1(f)   because of the quasi-concavity of A(d). Hence,
when f  f^ , d(f) = d1(f). If f^  f  , then @A(d)=@djd= > 0 and   d1(f); thus, d(f) = .
From the above, we nd that the value of d(f) is equal to either the constant  or d1(f), which is
the unique solution of (13). Taking the rst-order derivative of d1(f) w.r.t. f at both sides of (13), we
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have,
@[d1(f)]
@f
=
22c2
32[1  (F; )d1(f)]2 + 2c2
> 0,
which implies that d1(f) is strictly increasing in f . Next, we nd that
@[d1(f)]
@f
  1 =  3
2   2c2=[1  (F; )d1(f)]2
32[1  (F; )d1(f)]2 + 2c2
< 0,
where 32   2c2=[1  (F; )d1(f)]2 > 0 because d1(f)   and 2   2c2=[1  (F; )d]2  0. Then,
we can show that
@2[d1(f)]
@f2
=
12(F; )22c2[1  (F; )d1(f)]
f32[1  (F; )d1(f)]2 + 2c2g2
@[d1(f)]
@f
> 0,
which means that d1(f) is convex in f . This theorem is thus proved.
Proof of Theorem 2. We rst maximize 1(f) subject to cI  f  f^ . We take the logarithm of
1(f) and obtain ln[1(f)] = ln(=4) + 1 + 2 + 3, where
1  ln[d1(f)  f   cA], 2  ln

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.
The rst- and second-order derivatives of 1 w.r.t. f are computed as,
@1
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=
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Since d1(f) satises the rst-order condition where @A(d)=@d is given as in (12), we have,
1
d1(f)  f   cA =
2(F; )2c2
2[1  (F; )d1(f)]3   2c2[1  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.
Thus, the second term at the right-hand side of @21=@f
2 can be re-written as,
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Then, we di¤erentiate 2 once and twice w.r.t. f , and have,
@2
@f
=  @d1(f)
@f

2(F; )c2
[1  (F; )d1(f)]3f2=   c2=[1  (F; )d1(f)]2g

;
2
Interchange Fee Rate, Merchant Discount Rate, and Retail Price Online Appendices
and
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We then nd that
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which is smaller than zero.
Next, we examine the concavity of 3. The rst- and second-order derivatives of 3 w.r.t. f are
computed as,
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2[1  (F; )d1(f)]4

@[d1(f)]
@f
2
F +
(F; )(f + t  cI)
4

2

  c
2
[1  (F; )d1(f)]2

  1
F +
(F; )(f + t  cI)
4

2

  c
2
[1  (F; )d1(f)]2
 [(F; )]2c2(f + t  cI)
2[1  (F; )d1(f)]3
@2[d1(f)]
@f2
 

(F; )
4

2

  c
2
[1  (F; )d1(f)]2

  [(F; )]
2c2(f + t  cI)
2[1  (F; )d1(f)]3
@[d1(f)]
@f
2

F +
(F; )(f + t  cI)
4

2

  c
2
[1  (F; )d1(f)]2
2 ,
which is smaller than zero; that is, 3 is log-concave. Thus, ln[1(f)] = ln(=4)+ 1 + 2 + 3 is strictly
concave in f ; and consequently, 1(f) is strictly log-concave in f . That is, 1(f) reaches its maximum
with an ~f1 that satises @[1(f)]=@f = 0. We can nd f1 as given in the theorem.
Next, we maximize 2(f) subject to f^  f  . Taking the rst- and second-order derivatives of
3
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2(f) w.r.t. f , we have,
@2(f)
@f
=  (F; )
4

2

  c
2
[1  (F; )]2

F +
(F; )(f + t  cI)
4

2

  c
2
[1  (F; )]2

+
[(F; )]2[  f   cA]
16

2

  c
2
[1  (F; )]2
2
,
@2[2(f)]
@f2
=   [(F; )]
2
8

2

  c
2
[1  (F; )]2
2
< 0,
which means that 2(f) is strictly concave in f . Letting ~f2 denote the solution to @2(f)=@f = 0, we
have,
~f2 =
  cA + cI   t
2
  2F
(F; )f2=   c2=[1  (F; )]2g .
We then consider the constraint that f^  f  . As   d  f+cA and f  cI , we nd that   cA+cI ,
or, cI   cA. Hence, ~f2  . It follows that the optimal interchange-fee rate f2 = max(f^ ; ~f2). When
f = f^ , the rst-order derivative @[2(f)]=@f is computed as,
@[2(f)]
@f

f=f^
=
(F; )
4

2

  c
2
[1  (F; )]2


(
 F   [(F; )]
2c2(  f^   cA)(2f^ + cA + t  cI   )
2[1  (F; )]3
)
=
(F; )
4
&

2

  c
2
[1  (F; )]2

,
where
&   F + [(1  (F; ))
22   2c2][(F; )2c2(cA + cI   t) + [1  (F; )]32   2c2]
43c2[1  (F; )]2 .
It follows that, when f = f^ , @[2(f)]=@f has the same sign as the term &. We can show that, if r1  r2
where ri (i = 1; 2) are dened as in this theorem, then @2(f)=@f is non-negative at the point of
f = f^ . Because of the concavity of 2(f), f^  ~f2 and thus, f2 = ~f2. If r1  r2, then @2(f)=@f is
non-positive at the point of f = f^ , which means that f^  ~f2 and f2 = f^ .
Using the above, we nd that, if r1  r2, then f2 = f^ . Since 1(f^) = 2(f^), f = f1 . When
r1  r2, then f2 = ~f2 and the NBS-characterized rate f depends on the comparison between 1(f1 )
and 2( ~f2). This theorem is thus proved.
Proof of Theorem 3. We learn from Driessen [14] that, in order to show the supermodularity, we
need to prove that v(S [ fig)   v(S)  v(T [ fig)   v(T ), for all S  T  Nnfig, i = M;A; I. If
S = T , then the above condition for the supermodularity must be satised. Next, we assume that
S  T  Nnfig, and examine if the above condition is satised.
1. If S = ? and T = fMg, then player i is either A or I, and we nd that v(S [ fig)   v(S) =
v(i)   v(?) = 0, because v(?) = v(A) = v(I) = 0; and v(T [ fig)   v(T ) = v(Mi)   v(M)  0
4
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if f  d  dMA = fMI  ff j M2(pM2(f)) = v(M)g, as discussed in Sections C.2 and C.3.
Therefore, the supermodularity condition is satised.
2. If S = ? and T = fAg, then player i is either M or I. If i = I, then v(S [ fIg)   v(S) =
v(I)  v(?) = v(T [ fIg)  v(T ) = v(AI)  v(A) = 0. If i = M , then we nd that
v(S [ fMg)  v(S) = v(M)  v(T [ fMg)  v(T ) = v(MA).
3. If S = ? and T = fIg, then player i is either M or A. Similar to case 2, we nd that the
supermodularity condition is satised.
4. If S = fAg and T = fAIg, then player i is M . As a result, v(S [ fMg)   v(S) = v(MA)
and v(T [ fMg)  v(T ) = v(MAI). For both the coalitions fMAg and fMAIg, the merchants
optimal retail price is f=+ c=[1  (F; )d]g=2; but, the merchant discount rate d is negotiated
by M and A in the coalition fMAg whereas it results from the negotiation among M , A, and I
in the grand coalition fMAIg. We re-write the characteristic values of the two coalitions as,
v(MA) = F +
1 + (F; )(t  cA   cI)
4

2

+
c2
[1  (F; )dMA]2

 c
2



+
(F; )c(dMA + t  cA   cI)
[1  (F; )dMA]2

,
v(MAI) = F +
1 + (F; )(t  cA   cI)
4

2

+
c2
(1  (F; )d)2

 c
2



+
(F; )c(d+ t  cA   cI)
[1  (F; )d]2

.
Thus, if d  dMA, then v(MAI) > v(MA).
5. If S = fAg and T = fMAg, then player i is I, and it thus follows that v(S [ fIg)   v(S) = 0
and v(T [ fIg)  v(T ) = v(MAI)  v(MA), which is non-negative if d  dMA, as discussed for
case 4.
6. If S = fIg and T = fAIg, then player i is M . As a result, v(S [ fMg)   v(S) = v(MI) and
v(T[fMg) v(T ) = v(MAI). Similar to case 4, we nd that, if d  fMI , then v(MAI)  v(MI).
Note that, in the coalition fMIg, fMI is equivalent to the merchant discount rate because the
issuer also acts as an acquirer.
7. If S = fIg and T = fMIg, then player i is A. Hence, v(S [ fAg)  v(S) = 0 and v(T [ fAg) 
v(T ) = v(MAI)  v(MI). Similar to case 6, we nd that, if d  fMI , then v(MAI)  v(MI).
8. If S = fMg and T = fMAg, then player i is I. As a result, v(S [ fIg)  v(S) = v(MI)  v(M)
and v(T [ fIg)   v(T ) = v(MAI)   v(MA). For this case, we need to nd whether or not
v(MAI) + v(M)  v(MA) + v(MI). Because of the intractable complexity, we cannot compare
v(MAI) + v(M) and v(MA) + v(MI) analytically. But, we note that, if v(MAI) + v(M) 
v(MA) + v(MI), then v(MAI) must be greater than or equal to both v(MA) and v(MI).
9. If S = fMg and T = fMIg, then player i is A. Similar to case 8, we cannot determine if
v(MAI) + v(M) is greater than v(MA) + v(MI) analytically.
In conclusion, we prove this theorem.
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Proof of Theorem 4. We use the denition of the core [16] to derive su¢ cient conditions. That
is, we analyze the inequalities that
P
i2T yi  v(T ) for all coalitions T  N = fM;A; Ig. Recall that
yM = M4(d), yA = A4(d), and yI = I4(f).
1. When T = fAg, v(T ) = v(A) = 0 and
X
i2T yi = yA = A4(d) =
(F; )(d  f   cA)
4

2

  c
2
[1  (F; )d]2

.
If f + cA  d  (  c)=[(F; )], then yA  v(A).
2. When T = fIg, v(T ) = v(I) = 0 and
X
i2T yi = yI = F +
(F; )(f + t  cI)
4

2

  c
2
[1  (F; )d]2

.
If f  cI   t and d  (  c)=[(F; )], then yI  v(I).
3. When T = fMg, v(T ) = v(M) which is given as in Section C.1 and
X
i2T yi = yM =
[1  (F; )d]
4



  c
1  (F; )d
2
.
Comparing the above with v(M) given in Section C.1, we nd that, if d  dMA = fd j
M3(p
M3(d)) = v(M)g, as dened in Section C.3 then yM  v(M).
4. When T = fA; Ig, v(T ) = v(AI) = 0 and
X
i2T yi = yA + yI = F +
(F; )(d+ t  cA   cI)
4

2

  c
2
[1  (F; )d]2

,
which is greater than or equal to v(AI) if cA + cI   t  d  (  c)=[(F; )].
5. When T = fM; Ig, v(T ) = v(MI), which is re-written as,
v(MI) = F +
[1  (F; )fMI ]
4



  c
1  (F; )fMI
2
+
(F; )(fMI + t  cI   cA)
4

2

  c
2
[1  (F; )fMI ]2

,
Moreover, we have,
X
i2T yi = yM + yI = F +
[1  (F; )d]
4



  c
1  (F; )d
2
+
(F; )(f + t  cI)
4

2

  c
2
[1  (F; )d]2

,
which is greater than or equal to v(MI) if fMI   cA  f  d  fMI .
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6. When T = fM;Ag, v(T ) = v(MA); that is,
v(MA) = F +
[1  (F; )dMA]
4



  c
1  (F; )dMA
2
+
(F; )(dMA + t  cA   cI)
4

2

  c
2
(1  (F; )dMA)2

.
We also have,X
i2T yi = yM + yA
=
[1  (F; )d]
4



  c
1  (F; )d
2
+
(F; )(d  f   cA)
4

2

  c
2
[1  (F; )d]2

,
which is greater than or equal to v(MA) if f + dMA + t  cI  d  dMA.
7. When T = N = fM;A; Ig, v(T ) = v(MAI) =
X
i2T yi.
Using the above, we can nd the conditions assuring that the core is non-empty, as given in this
theorem.
Proof of Corollary 1. If we assume that  > 1 and let d = min(dMA; fMI) and f = fMI   cA,
then the conditions in (10) are satised because cA+ cI  fMI  cA+cI and cA+cI   t  dMA 
cA + cI   t, as discussed in Section 4.1. That is, when  > 1, the set  and the core are non-empty.
If  = 1, then the rst condition in (10) can be re-written as,
f + dMA + t  cI  d  min(dMA; fMI), (14)
which cannot be satised because of the following reason. Since f  cI so as to assure the issuers pos-
itive revenue, the rst inequality in (14) implies that d > dMA, which contradicts its second inequality.
Therefore, the set  and the core are empty if  = 1.
Proof of Theorem 5. Temporarily ignoring the constraint d 2 , we compute the rst- and
second-order derivatives of v(MAI) as,
@v(MAI)
@d
=
[(F; )]2c2(cI + cA   d  t)
2[1  (F; )d]3 and
@2v(MAI)
@d2
=   [(F; )]
2c2
2[1  (F; )d]3 < 0,
which implies that, if cI +cA  t, v(MAI) is a concave function with the optimal value d0 = cI +cA  t;
otherwise, v(MAI) is an decreasing function of d. From Sections C.2 and C.3, we note that both fMI
and dMA are greater than cI + cA   t. Moreover, we nd that, in , f  fMI   cA; thus,
f + dMA + t  cI  (fMI   cA   cI + t) + (dMA   cA   cI + t) + (cI + cA   t),
which is greater than (cI + cA   t) because fMI  cA + cI   t and dMA  cA + cI   t as discussed
in Sections C.2 and C.3. Therefore, we can nd the globally optimal merchant discount rate dG as in
this theorem.
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Appendix B Top U.S. Acquirers and Issuers and Their Shares of
Dollar Value Transactions in 2007
In a recent report released by Divisions of Research & Statistics and Monetary A¤airs in the U.S.
Federal Reserve Board [32], Prager et al. listed the top 10 U.S. acquirers and the top 10 U.S. issuers,
and provided their shares of all credit card transactions (in dollars) in 2007. For the information, see
Table 2.
Top 10
U.S. Acquirers
Share of All
U.S. Acquirers
Transactions (%)
Top 10
U.S. Issuers
Share of All
U.S. Issuers
Transactions (%)
First Data Corp. 32.4 American Express 24.7
Bank of America 17.8 JP Morgan Chase 17.6
Chase Paymentech
Solutions
11.8 Bank of America 14.6
Fifth Third 11.7 Citigroup 12.3
Nova Information 3.8 Capital One 5.9
Global Payments 2.8 Discover 5.0
Heartland Data
Systems
2.5 U.S. Bank 3.6
Alliance Data
Systemes
2.4 HSBC 2.3
RBS Lynk 2.0 Wells Fargo 2.1
First National 1.5 GE Money 1.5
Total 88.7 Total 89.6
Table 2: Top U.S. Acquirers and Issuers and Their Shares of Dollar Value Transactions in 2007. The
data is provided by Prager et al. from Divisions of Research & Statistics and Monetary A¤airs in the
U.S. Federal Reserve Board [32].
Appendix C The Calculation of Characteristic Values in the Three-
Player Cooperative Game
As discussed in Section 4.1, v(?) = v(A) = v(I) = v(AI) = 0. We need to calculate the characteristic
values v(M), v(MI), v(MA), and v(MAI).
C.1 The Characteristic Value v(M)
In the coalition fMg, the merchant may still cooperate with the acquirer and the issuer for the credit
card business in the two-stage game (traditional) setting as discussed in Section 3, where the merchant
does not bargain with the acquirer and the issuer for the interchange fee rate and the merchant
discount rate. If the merchant does not cooperate with any bank, then it may itself operate the
credit card business, acting as both an issuer and an acquirer. For example, the Japan United Stores
Company (JUSCO) is a well-known chain of general merchandise storesin Japan, and various JUSCO
companies are subsidiaries of AEON Japan Group. In 1981, the AEON group established the AEON
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Credit Japan, which has become one of the largest credit card issuers in Japan. For over 12 years,
the AEON Credit Japan and the JUSCO companies have jointly launched a variety of co-branded
credit cards that are labeled with AEON, JUSCO, and a credit card company/network (e.g., Visa,
MasterCard, American Express, etc.) that the AEON Credit Japan and JUSCO companies join. Note
that even though the AEON and JUSCO join credit card networks such as Visa and MasterCard, they
do not cooperate with any external acquirers and issuers but instead process credit card transactions
by themselves. For more information regarding the AEON JUSCO credit cards, see a report by the
Kenanga Research company1. As another example, Tesco, a British multinational grocery and general
merchandise retailer, issues the Clubcard Credit Card.
According to the above, the merchant needs to compare its prot in the traditional setting and
that when it operates the credit card business itself. We learn from Section 3 that, in the tradi-
tional setting, the Stackelberg equilibrium-characterized merchant discount rate and retail price are
dS and pS , respectively, as obtained in (8), and the merchants corresponding prot is M (pS) =
[1   dS(F; )]f=   c=[1   dS(F; )]g2=4. Next, we compute the merchants prot M1(p), when
the rm processes credit card transactions by itself. The merchant incurs a per dollar operation cost
cA for its acquirer role and a per dollar operation cost cI for its issuer role, where cA and cI are
the external acquirers and issuers per dollar operation costs, respectively. We assume that ;   1,
which is reasonable because of the following facts: Acquirers and issuers are usually nancial rms
that are specialized in the operational process of credit card transactions. Moreover, those nancial
rms process a very large transaction amount that can reduce their marginal operation costs due to
economies of scale. Thus, acquirers and issuers should process transactions more e¢ ciently than the
merchant. In order to assure the participation of the merchant in the credit card business, we also
assume that cA + cI  1.
Similar to Section 3.1.1, we calculate the merchants revenue attributed to the transactions with
credit cards as (F; M )p( p), where M is the density of the merchants network. Noting that,
from the perspective of credit card operations, a merchants network density should be signicantly
smaller than a nancial rms network density, we reasonably assume that M < . It thus follows
that (F; M ) < (F; ), which implies that, if the merchant operates itself, then less consumers
will shop with the credit card issued by the merchant. We then calculate the merchants operation
cost as (F; M )  p  (cA + cI)  (   p). Similar to our discussion in Section 3.2, when the
merchant takes the issuer role in the transactions with credit cards, it should charge credit card
consumers the xed fee F and the credit interest t  (F; M )  R = t  (F; M )  p  (   p).
Therefore, acting by itself in the coalition fMg, the merchants prot is calculated as M1(p) =
F + f[1 + (F; M )t   (F; M )cA   (F; M )cI ]p   cg(   p). The merchant maximizes M1(p)
to determine its optimal retail price as pM1 = f= + c=[1   (F; M )(cA + cI   t)]g=2, and its
corresponding maximum prot is computed as,
M1(p
M1) = F +
[1  (F; M )(cA + cI   t)]
4



  c
1  (F; M )(cA + cI   t)
2
.
1http://aeoncr.listedcompany.com/misc/kenanga/121207.pdf (URL last accessed on July 24, 2012).
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According to the above discussion, we nd that the merchant should compare its prot in the traditional
setting M with its prot M1(p
M1) resulting from operating the credit card business by itself. There-
fore, the characteristic value of the coalition fMg can be computed as v(M) = max[M (pS);M1(pM1)].
C.2 The Characteristic Value v(MI)
In the coalition fMIg, the merchant cooperates with the issuer to process consumerspayments with
the merchant-labeled credit cards issued by the issuer. For this coalition, the issuer also acts as an
acquirer, since, as a nancial rm serving the merchant, the issuer now also processes the cardhold-
ers (consumers) bills and directly deposits their payments (excluding the interchange fee) into the
merchants account. For example, the Citibank has issued the Sears credit cards since the Sear sold
its retail credit card operations to the Citibank in 2003, as reported by The New York Times2. As
the Citibank has taken over the Searss retail credit card operations, the Sears is no more involved in
the nancial process of any credit card transactions. The Citibank now acts as an issuer as well as an
acquirer to transfer relevant transaction amount to the Searscorporate account at the Citibank. For
more discussions and other examples (e.g., Macys), see DeGennaro [13].
Since an issuer acts as an acquirer in addition to its own card issuing business, we do not need
to consider the merchant discount rate for the coalition fMIg because the issuer charges the merchant
(rather than an acquirer) for the interchange fee. Thus, the issuer and the merchant negotiate the
interchange fee rate f , and the merchant then makes its retail pricing decision. Similarly, we solve this
two-stage game using the backward induction approach. Assuming that f is given, we maximize the
merchants prot M2(p) = f[1  (F; )f ]p  cg(  p), and nd the merchants best-response retail
price as pM2(f) = f= + c=[1   (F; )f ]g=2. The merchants maximum prot is thus calculated as
M2(p
M2(f)) = [1  (F; )f ]f=   c=[1  (F; )f ]g2=4, which is decreasing in f .
Next, for the coalition fMIg, the issuer incurs a per dollar operation cost cI for its own card issuing
operations and a per dollar operation cost cA (where   1) for the acquiring-related operations. The
parameter  helps distinguish the issuer acting as an acquirer and the external acquirer specialized in
the relevant operations. Hence, the issuers prot is computed as,
I2(f) = F+(F; )(f+t cI cA)R(pM2(f)) = F+
(F; )(f + t  cI   cA)
4

2

  c
2
[1  (F; )f ]2

,
(15)
which is increasing in f . In the coalition fMIg, the issuer and the merchant negotiate the inter-
change fee rate f , anticipating the merchants pricing decision pM2(f). We accordingly use the NBS
to characterize the interchange fee rate. That is, we can nd the NBS-based solution by maximizing
MI = [M2(p
M2(f)) v(M)]I2(f) subject to M2(pM2(f))  v(M) and I2(f)  v(I) = 0, where
the merchants security level is v(M) because the merchant may operate in the coalition fMg if it does
not cooperate with the issuer; and the issuers security level is zero because the issuer cannot obtain
any prot from the credit card operation if it does not cooperate with any other players. Note that
M2(p
M2(f))  v(M) i¤ f  fMI  ff j M2(pM2(f)) = v(M)g because M2(pM2(f)) is decreasing in
2http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/16/business/sears-to-sell-card-portfolio-to-citigroup-for-3-billion.
html (URL last accessed on July 24, 2012).
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f , and I2(f)  v(I) i¤ cI + cA  t  f  (  c)=[(F; )]. The above NBS optimization problem
can be then re-written as, maxf MI , s.t. cI + cA   t  f < minf fMI ; (   c)=[(F; )]g = fMI ,
because M2(p
M2(f)) = 0 when f = (  c)=[(F; )].
Theorem 6 MI is quasi-concave in f , and there thus exists a unique NBS-characterized interchange
fee rate fMI for the coalition fMIg. Moreover, fMI < dS .
Proof. We re-write the function MI as,
MI =
1
4
"
[1  (F; )f ]



  c
1  (F; )f
2
  4v(M)
#


F +
(F; )(f + t  cI   cA)
4

2

  c
2
[1  (F; )f ]2

.
Similar to the proof of Theorem 2, we take the logarithm of MI and nd that ln MI = $1 +$2  ln 4,
where
$1  ln
"
[1  (F; )f ]



  c
1  (F; )f
2
  4v(M)
#
;
$2  ln

F +
(F; )(f + t  cI   cA)
4

2

  c
2
[1  (F; )f ]2

.
The rst- and second-order derivatives of $1 w.r.t. f are computed as,
@$1
@f
=



  c
1  (F; )f
  (F; )f=   c=[1  (F; )f ]g2   2c(F; )=[1  (F; )f ]
[1  (F; )f ]f=   c=[1  (F; )f ]g2   4v(M) ,
and
@2$1
@f2
=  
f=   c=[1  (F; )f ]g2f[1  (F; )f ]= + cg2
[1  (F; )f ]f=   c=[1  (F; )f ]g2   4v(M)  
2c2
1  (F; )f

 [(F; )]
2
[1  (F; )f ]2f[1  (F; )f ][=   c=(1  (F; )f)]2   4v(M)g ,
which is negative because
f=   c=[1  (F; )f ]g2
[1  (F; )f ]f=   c=[1  (F; )f ]g2   4v(M) >
1
1  (F; )f and
[1  (F; )f ]

 c.
Next, we di¤erentiate $2 once and twice w.r.t. f , and have,
@$2
@f
=
(F; )
4
f2=   c2=[1  (F; )f ]2g   2(F; )c2(f + t  cI   cA)=[1  (F; )f ]3
F + (F; )(f + t  cI   cA)f2=   c2=[1  (F; )f ]2g=4 ,
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and
@2$2
@f2
=  (F; )f[
2=   c2=(1  (F; )f)2]  2(F; )c2(f + t  cI   cA)=(1  (F; )f)3g2
4fF + (F; )(f + t  cI   cA)[=   c=(1  (F; )f)]=4g2
  [(F; )]
2c2f2 + 3(F; )(f + t  cI   cA)=[1  (F; )f ]g
2[1  (F; )f ]3fF + (F; )(f + t  cI   cA)[=   c=(1  (F; )f)]=4g ,
which is negative. Therefore, ln(MI) is a quasi-concave function, and MI is thus also a quasi-concave
function. Moreover, we nd that fMI  fMI < dS . This theorem is thus proved.
Following along the lines similar to those in Section C.1, we nd that, if the issuer can e¢ ciently
act as an acquirerwith a small value of , then the merchant and the issuer may be likely to operate
the credit card business without subcontracting the acquiring operations out to the acquirer as in the
two-stage game setting that is discussed in Section 3. We compute the characteristic value v(MI) as
M2(p
M2(fMI)) + I2(f
MI); that is,
v(MI) = F +
1 + (F; )(t  cI   cA)
4

2

+
c2
[1  (F; )fMI ]2

 c
2



+
(F; )c(fMI + t  cI   cA)
[1  (F; )fMI ]2

 v(M).
C.3 The Characteristic Value v(MA)
In the coalition fMAg, the merchant and the acquirer cooperate for the credit card business. The
acquirer participates in the card issuing business in addition to its own acquiring operations. This
coalition exists in practice. For example, as the bank at which The Gapp Inc. opens its account,
the General Electric (GE) Money Bank issues the Gap credit card, acting as both the acquirer and
the issuer. The game for this coalition is described as follows: The merchant and the acquirer rst
negotiate the merchant discount rate. Then, the merchant makes its own pricing decisions. Similar to
the above, we still use the backward induction approach to nd the value v(MA).
Given the merchant discount rate d, the merchants optimal retail price maximizing its prot
M3(p) = f[1  (F; )d]p  cg(  p) can be found as pM3(d) = f=+c=[1 (F; )d]g=2. The cor-
responding maximum prot is calculated as M3(p
M3(d)) = [1  (F; )d]f=  c=[1  (F; )d]g2=4.
For the coalition fMAg, the acquirer is assumed to incur a per dollar operation cost cA for its own
acquiring operations and a per dollar operation cost cI (where   1) for the issuer-related operations.
The acquirers prot A3(d) is thus calculated as,
A3(d) = F+(F; )(d+t cA cI)R(pM3(d)) = F+
(F; )(d+ t  cA   cI)
4

2

  c
2
[1  (F; )d]2

,
(16)
which is non-negative i¤ cA + cI   t  d  (  c)=[(F; )].
Then, we use the NBS to determine the merchant discount rate as a result of the negotiation
between the acquirer and the merchant; that is, we can nd the NBS-based solution by maximizing
MA = [M3(p
M3(d))   v(M)]  A3(d) subject to M3(pM3(d))  v(M) and A3(d)  0, where,
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using our arguments for the coalition fMAg, we nd that the security levels for the merchant and the
acquirer are v(M) and zero, respectively. Similar to Section C.2, we can re-write the NBS optimization
problem as: maxd MA = [M3(p
M3(d))   v(M)]  A3(d), s.t. cA + cI   t  d < dMA  fd j
M3(p
M3(d)) = v(M)g, where dMA is equivalent to fMI in Section C.2.
Theorem 7 MA is quasi-concave in d; thus, a unique NBS-characterized merchant discount rate
dMA must exist for the coalition fMAg. Moreover, we nd that dMA < dS .
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 6.
Using similar lines as those in Section C.2, we nd that whether or not the acquirer and the
merchant are willing to undertake the credit card business by themselves depends on the acquirers
e¢ ciency in acting as an issuer in the coalition fMAg. Substituting dMA into the merchants
and the acquirers prot functions gives the characteristic value of the coalition fMAg as v(MA) =
M3(p
M3(dMA)) + A3(d
MA); that is,
v(MA) = F +
1 + (F; )(t  cA   cI)
4

2

+
c2
[1  (F; )dMA]2

 c
2



+
(F; )c(dMA + t  cA   cI)
[1  (F; )dMA]2

 v(M).
C.4 The Characteristic Value v(MAI)
In the grand coalition fMAIg, the merchant, the acquirer, and the issuer cooperate for the credit card
business. This coalition is the most common in practice. For example, Wal-Mart opens its account at
the GE Money Bank, and accepts the Citibank credit card payments. In this example, Wal-Mart, the
GE Money Bank, and the Citibank act as the merchant, the acquirer, and the issuer, respectively.
After forming the grand coalition, the three rms rst determine both the interchange fee rate f
and the merchant discount rate d, and the merchant then determines its retail price. Next, we use
backward induction to calculate the value v(MAI). Given the rates d and f , the merchant maximizes
its prot M4(p) = f[1   (F; )d]p   cgq(p), and determines the optimal retail price as pM4(d) =
pM3(d) = f=+c=[1 (F; )d]g=2. Anticipating the above, the merchant, the acquirer, and the issuer
determine the interchange fee rate f and merchant discount rate d. Consequently, the merchants, the
acquirers, and the issuers prot functions are
M4(d) = [1  (F; )d]f=   c=[1  (F; )d]g2=4, (17)
A4(d) = (F; )(d  f   cA)R(pM4(d)) and I4(f) = F + (F; )(f + t  cI)R(pM4(d)), (18)
where R(pM4(d)) = f2=   c2=[1   (F; )d]2g=4 is the sales revenue realized by the merchant. It
then follows that the characteristic value v(MAI) (i.e., the three playerstotal prot) is computed as
v(MAI) = M4(d) + A4(d) + I4(f), i.e.,
v(MAI) = F +

  c
1  (F; )d

1 + (F; )(t  cI   cA)
4



+
c
1  (F; )d

  1
2
c

. (19)
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Appendix D The LP algorithm for the Calculation of the Nucleolus
To calculate the nucleolus for our credit card game, we develop an LP algorithm as follows.
1. The rst LP model is developed as,
mind;f u,
s.t. v(T ) Pi2T xi  u, for any T  fM;A; Ig; (i)
xM + xA + xI = v(MAI); (ii)
xM = M4(d) and xA = A4(d); (iii)
f + dMA + t  cI  d  min(dMA; fMI) and fMI   cA  f , (iv)
(20)
where u denotes the unhappiness of the most unhappy coalition; the constraint (i) assures that
the unhappiness of all coalitions are smaller than or equal to the maximum unhappiness (upper
bound) u; the constraint (ii) assures that v(MAI) is completely allocated amongM , A and I; the
constraint (iii) assures that the three rms implement the allocation by determining d and f , as
discussed previously; and the constraint (iv) assures that the nucleolus-characterized interchange
fee rate and merchant discount rate are in the set  and the game has a non-empty core.
Solving the above LP model yields the nucleolus-characterized dn and fn, and we can terminate
our search if either of the following conditions is satised.
(a) All of the constraints are binding. When all constraints are binding, all coalitionsunhap-
piness are minimized and the optimal solution is the nucleolus.
(b) Not all of the constraints are binding; but, the binding constraints can uniquely determine an
optimal solution. For example, if the constraints corresponding to the coalitions fMg, fAg
and fIg are binding, then we can nd a unique optimal solution by solving fv(M) xM = u,
v(A)  xA = u, and v(I)  xI = ug, where u is the minimum value found by solving (20).
Otherwise, we continue with the second step.
2. For the second LP problem, we again solve the constrained minimization model in (20) but,
in the constraint set (i), the inequality  is replaced with the equality = for each binding
constraint that results from the minimization of the largest unhappiness in the rst LP problem.
Similarly, after solving the second LP problem, we examine (i) what constraints are binding and
(ii) whether or not the binding constraints can determine a unique optimal solution. If one or
both of the conditions are satised, we then terminate our search; otherwise, we continue with
the third step.
3. We repeat the above steps until all constraints are binding and/or the binding constraints uniquely
determine an optimal solution.
For a detailed discussion of the LP approach for the nucleolus solution, see Leng and Parlar [21]
and Wang [46].
Appendix E Results of the Sensitivity Analysis
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cA(%) f
S(%) dS(%) fn(%) dn(%)  fn(%) dn(%)
0:10 4:4162 15:4678 0:3000 0:4000 9 0:3000 1:4394
0:15 4:3989 15:4825 0:3000 0:4500 10 0:3000 1:8060
0:20 4:3816 15:4971 0:3000 0:8875 11 0:3000 2:1715
0:25 4:3643 15:5118 0:3000 1:5770 12 0:3000 2:5358
0:30 4:3470 15:5265 0:3000 2:2627 13 0:3000 2:8988
0:35 4:3297 15:5411 0:3000 2:9441 14 0:3242 3:2606
0:40 4:3124 15:5558 0:4471 3:5310 15 0:4471 3:5310
0:45 4:2950 15:5705 0:4425 3:5760 16 0:4534 3:5376
0:50 4:2777 15:5851 0:4379 3:6209 17 0:4581 3:5425
0:55 4:2604 15:5998 0:4332 3:6659 18 0:4644 3:5491
cI(%) f
S(%) dS(%) fn(%) dn(%)  fn(%) dn(%)
0:30 4:1816 15:4971 0:1000 2:1261 9 0:3000 2:6635
0:35 4:2143 15:5118 0:1500 2:4416 9:5 0:3000 2:7833
0:40 4:2470 15:5265 0:2000 2:7553 10 0:3000 2:9028
0:45 4:2797 15:5411 0:2500 3:0670 10:5 0:3000 3:0219
0:50 4:3124 15:5558 0:4471 3:5310 11 0:3000 3:1406
0:55 4:3450 15:5705 0:5332 3:6659 11:5 0:3447 3:3057
0:60 4:3777 15:5851 0:5786 3:7108 12 0:4471 3:5310
0:65 4:4104 15:5998 0:6239 3:7557 12:5 0:4879 3:6209
0:70 4:4430 15:6144 0:6692 3:8006 13 0:4879 3:6209
0:75 4:4756 15:6291 0:7145 3:8454 13:5 0:4879 3:6209
Table 3: The impacts of the parameters cA and cI on the Stackelberg interchange fee rate and merchant
discount rate (fS ; dS) in the two-stage game setting and on the nucleolus-characterized rates (fn; dn)
in the three-player cooperative game setting; and the impacts of  and  on the nucleolus-characterized
rates (fn; dn) in the three-player cooperative game setting.
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